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I. 
JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1987). 
II. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the district court correct in granting Atlantic 
Richfield Company (ffARCOlf) and ASARCOf Inc. ("ASARCO11) summary 
judgment on the basis that United Park's fiduciary duty and 
negligence claims arising out of events which occurred in 1975 
and prior thereto were barred by the statute of limitations 
where the undisputed evidence demonstrated that independent 
directors and shareholders of United Park knew or should have 
known of the facts giving rise to these claims in 1975 and 
thereafter. 
2. Was the district court correct in granting ARCO and 
ASARCO summary judgment dismissing United Park's claims as 
barred by the Bangor Punta doctrine where the undisputed 
evidence demonstrated that Loeb Investors Company XL ("Loeb") 
purchased all of ARCO's and ASARCO1s stock in United Park (a 
total of 31%) in 1985 at fair value and then utilized its 
control of United Park to join with the Bamberger Group 
("Bamberger"), another major stockholder, to bring suit against 
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ARCO and ASARCO for alleged breach of fiduciary duty and 
negligence occurring long before that stock purchase, thus 
seeking to obtain a windfall of millions of dollars more than 
Loeb bargained for when it purchased ARCO's and ASARCOfs stock? 
If this suit is not totally barred, must any recovery go 
directly to United Park's shareholders who were shareholders at 
the time of the alleged loss? 
3. Was the district court correct in granting summary 
judgment dismissing United Park's breach of fiduciary duty and 
negligence claims against ARCO and ASARCO on the basis that ARCO 
and ASARCO were not responsible for any alleged breach of 
fiduciary duty by their employees in their capacities as 
directors of United Park just because ARCO and ASARCO caused 
those individuals to be elected as directors. 
4. Did the district court abuse its discretion in 
refusing to delay a decision on ARCO's and ASARCOfs Motion for 
Summary Judgment to allow United Park to conduct further 
discovery where United Park had already had over two years to 
conduct discovery, had in fact conducted substantial discovery, 
no discovery was attempted for the four months prior to the 
hearing on the motion, the further discovery which United Park 
belatedly sought was not relevant to the grounds upon which 
summary judgment was sought or was merely cumulative to 
discovery already conducted, and the Rule 56(f) affidavit filed 
by United Park did not specifically set forth the evidence which 
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United Park wanted to discover or the relevancy of that 
information to the issues raised by the motion. 
The standard of review for issue number 4 is abuse of 
discretion. The standard of review for the remaining issues is 
whether there were any genuine issues of material fact which 
precluded summary judgment. 
III. 
INTRODUCTION 
From 1953 until 1985, ARCO and its predecessor, the 
Anaconda Company, and ASARCO were major stockholders in United 
Park. During that period of time, ARCO and ASARCO invested 
millions of dollars in United Park and its properties for the 
purpose of financing acquisitions and capital improvements and 
never received any return on those expenditures. 
By the summer of 1974, Greater Park City Corporation 
("GPCC11), which owned the Park City Ski Resort and in which 
United Park was a major stockholder, was on the verge of 
bankruptcy. GPCC had a debt to equity ratio of over 95% and 
could not service its enormous debt, then in excess of $2 0 
million and growing. GPCC had to borrow $2 million from its 
stockholders while it attempted to come up with some arrangement 
to avert financial ruin. As a result, in 1975, after 
substantial study and based upon the demands of other 
stockholders and GPCC's main lender, United Park agreed to a 
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restructuring of GPCC, as a part of which United Park gave up 
its ownership interest in the floundering company for a nominal 
amount after seeking and obtaining overwhelming approval of 
United Park's stockholders for the transaction. 
In 1985, Loeb purchased all of the stock of ARCO and 
ASARCO in United Park, and together with Bamberger, assumed 
control of United Park. Apparently Loeb and Bamberger had more 
in mind at the time Loeb purchased its United Park stock than 
simply attempting to improve United Park's fortunes through 
business operations. In May, 1986, soon after acquiring 
control, Loeb and Bamberger caused United Park to file suit 
against Greater Park City Company ("GPCC"), owner of the Park 
City Ski Resort, Royal Street Land Company ("Royal Street"), 
owner of the Deer Valley Resort, and certain of their 
affiliates, alleging various imagined wrongs going back many 
years. 
After conducting very extensive discovery over a period 
of approximately two years, and when it became apparent the 
lawsuit was going nowhere, United Park fired its attorneys and 
retained new counsel who eventually sought to breath new life 
into the floundering litigation by filing an Amended Complaint 
in June, 1988, adding ARCO and ASARCO as parties. United Park 
sought in its Amended Complaint to resurrect ancient history by 
complaining that ARCO and ASARCO, as "control shareholders", 
violated duties allegedly owed to United Park by causing United 
Park to enter into agreements concerning the Park City Ski 
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Resort which had been overwhelmingly approved by United Park's 
stockholders in 1975, thirteen years prior to the filing of the 
Amended Complaint. United Park claims that ARCO and ASARCO by 
virtue of these agreements gave away substantial United Park 
assets to the detriment of the corporation and its stockholders, 
of which ARCO and ASARCO were the largest. There is no cLaim or 
evidence that ARCO or ASARCO received any secret profit from 
these transactions in which they supposedly intentionally 
inflicted enormous damage on themselves. 
As will hereinafter be demonstrated, the district court 
correctly rejected the attempt of Loeb and Bamberger, utilizing 
their control of United Park, to exact tribute from ARCO and 
ASARCO and the other Defendants by instituting this massive 
litigation more than a decade after the last of the alleged 
wrongs supposedly occurred. Because the issues involving ARCO 
and ASARCO are essentially the same, and in the interest of 
judicial economy, ARCO and ASARCO file this Brief jointly. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
United Park commenced this action in May, 1986, alleging 
various claims, including racketeering and fraud claims, against 
GPCC, Royal Street and their affiliates relating to the Park 
City and Deer Valley Ski Resorts. Thereafter, over a period of 
approximately two years, United Park engaged in very extensive 
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discovery, including the taking of numerous depositions and the 
review of thousands of documents, including literally every 
document which ARCO had concerning the transactions and numerous 
ASARCO documents which were voluntarily produced by ARCO and 
ASARCO even though they were not parties to the litigation. 
In June, 1988, United Park amended its Complaint to add 
ARCO and ASARCO as Defendants, alleging that they were guilty of 
breach of fiduciary duty and negligence in connection with 
transactions which occurred in 1971 and 1975 with respect to the 
Park City Ski Resort. United Park has abandoned any claim with 
respect to the 1971 transactions. 
In December, 1989, ARCO and ASARCO and the other 
Defendants filed motions for summary judgment as they had 
announced months previously they would do. Those motions were 
heard and granted by the court, the Honorable Pat B. Brian, 
Judge, in April, 1990. With respect to ARCO and ASARCO, the 
court determined that: (1) the claims were barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations; (2) the claims were barred 
under the Bangor Punta doctrine because Loeb and Bamberger were 
attempting to utilize their control of United Park to recover 
damages from ARCO and ASARCO, which, if successful, would enable 
Loeb to obtain a windfall by receiving much more than it 
bargained for with ARCO and ASARCO in acquiring their stock; (3) 
ARCO and ASARCO were not responsible for any breach of duty by 
their employees who served as directors of United Park; and (4) 
United Park was not entitled to conduct further discovery before 
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the motion for summary judgment was granted. United Park has 
appealed those decisions of the trial court. 
V. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
United Park includes in its Brief a Statement of Facts 
which could well double as a history of Park City. ARCO and 
ASARCO join in the arguments made by the Royal Street Defendants 
in their Brief that much of the "facts" set forth by United Park 
are based upon incompetent Affidavits which cannot be considered 
on this appeal. ARCO and ASARCO also set forth in Appendix D 
their specific objections to some of those facts. However, it 
is important to emphasize that except to the extent these 
factual assertions are discussed in Appellee's argument, the 
factual disputes are not directly relevant to the grounds upon 
which the court granted summary judgment, let alone controlling. 
The evidence below established the following undisputed 
facts, most of which came directly from the allegations of 
United Park's Amended Complaint. Although many of these facts 
are of a background nature and are not controlling with respect 
to the specific grounds on which ARCO's and ASARCO's summary 
judgment motions were based, they are nevertheless helpful to a 
complete understanding of the matter and for that reason will be 
set forth. 
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A. The Acquisition of United Park Stock by ARCO and 
ASARCO. 
1. United Park is, and at all relevant times was, a 
fully reporting, publicly held Delaware corporation whose stock 
is traded on the New York Stock Exchange, United Park is the 
successor-in-interest and surviving corporate entity of a number 
of mining companies which, since the late 19th century, operated 
mines in and around Park City. United Park has not actively 
mined its properties directly or through lessees since 1982 due 
to market and technological conditions which currently preclude 
economically sound mining, [Amended Complaint ff 1 and 14, R. 
2761 and 2765-66] 
2. In 1953, ARCO acquired stock in United Park in 
exchange for forgiveness of loans previously made when United 
Park's predecessors, Ontario Mining Company and Silver King 
Consolidated Mining Company, could not fulfill repayment 
obligations. ARCO's interest eventually increased to 18.4% of 
the common stock of United Park when loans that United Park 
could not repay were exchanged for equity. [Amended Complaint 
K 17, R. 2767; Edwards Aff., R. 4105-06] 
3. Similarly, in 1953, ASARCO obtained a stock 
ownership interest in United Park which eventually increased to 
12.7% from the exchange of unpaid loans for equity. [Amended 
Complaint f 17, R. 2767] 
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B. The 1971 Transactions. 
4. In the early 1960s, United Park began the 
development and construction of the Park City Ski Resort, then 
known as the Treasure Mountain Resort. Although the resort grew 
some each year, much more development was required to establish 
a destination resort and attain its profit potential. [Amended 
Complaint J 16, R. 2767] 
5. In 1970, faced with declining mining revenues and 
marginal operating results at the resort, United Park determined 
that the resort could best be developed by a skilled resort 
developer and manager. United Park therefore entered into an 
Option Agreement by which it agreed to sell the resort to Royal 
Street and its newly formed entity, Treasure Mountain Resort 
Co., whose name was later changed to Greater Park City Company. 
Pursuant to the Option Agreement and following the approval of 
the United Park stockholders, the following agreements were 
subsequently signed by the parties in 1971 (the "1971 
Transactions") : 
(a) A Land Purchase Agreement by which United Park 
sold to GPCC approximately 4,200 acres of land suitable 
for development together with the resort base 
facilities, golf course, other resort improvements and 
personal property for the sum of $5,400,000, payable 
$900,000 down with the balance payable in annual 
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installments and monthly interest payments over 
approximately 13 years, 
(b) Ski area leases by which United Park leased to 
GPCC certain property including the existing ski runs 
for an initial 20-year term and one additional 20-year 
term for a percentage of the lift revenue. 
(c) A Water Rights Purchase Agreement by which 
United Park sold water rights to GPCC for the sum of 
$500,000. United Park agreed to pass title to the water 
rights upon receipt of payment of the $500,000 and when 
all other agreements were fully performed. 
(d) Royal Street agreed to manage the activities 
of GPCC, including the resort and real estate 
development and sales. 
(e) United Park was given a stock option to 
purchase not less than 42.5% of the outstanding common 
stock of GPCC through the purchase of 900,000 shares of 
preferred stock at $1.00 per share and 900,000 shares of 
common stock at $.01 per share. 
[Amended Complaint, ff 23, 24, 25, R. 2769-73] 
6. All of agreements with respect to the 1971 
transactions were submitted to the United Park stockholders for 
approval. [Amended Complaint f 28, R. 2774-75] 
7. Accordingly, extensive proxy materials were 
prepared, submitted for review to the Securities & Exchange 
Commission and subsequently disseminated to all stockholders of 
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United Park. The proxy statement disclosed the above-referenced 
agreements, including acreage of property and the terms of 
purchase and lease. Also disclosed were the five year revenue 
figures from the resort activities. 
8. The 1971 transactions were submitted to a vote of 
the stockholders at the United Park annual meeting on July 14, 
1970, at which time the stockholders of United Park 
overwhelmingly approved the proposed agreements. [Amended 
Complaint f 28, R. 2774-75; Clark Wilson Depo. pp. 60-62, R. 
7930] 
9. During the period of time from 1972 through 1974, 
United Park exercised its stock option and acquired 900,000 
shares of GPCC common stock and 900,000 shares of GPCC preferred 
stock. [Amended Complaint J 38, R. 2778-79] 
C. The 1975 Transactions. 
10. Between 1971 and 1975, GPCC embarked on a major 
development of the Park City Resort. By the summer of 1974, 
GPCC had a debt to equity ratio of over 95% and was not able to 
service its enormous debt, then in excess of $20 Million and 
growing. GPCC was facing a financial collapse unless its 
finances could be restructured. [Amended Complaint ff 43 and 44, 
R. 2781-82] 
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11. In July 1974, GPCC's stockholders had to loan GPCC 
$2 Million, prorated among the stockholders in accordance with 
their stock ownership in order to keep GPCC afloat pending 
attempts to find a long-term financial solution. United Park's 
share of the loan was $787,000. [Amended Complaint f 45, R. 
2782] 
12. In June 1975, after extensive discussion, 
negotiations, and advice from outside consultants and counsel, 
and based on demands from GPCC's largest creditor, Union-
America, Inc., and the other stockholders of GPCC, a Memorandum 
of Agreement was entered into by United Park with GPCC's 
stockholders and major creditors by which GPCC's finances were 
restructured. Essentially, the restructuring involved the 
following: The largest secured creditors received various 
assets in partial payment for their indebtedness and were 
required to assume a partial loss. GPCC's largest creditor, 
Unionamerica Inc., received 20% of the GPCC stock. Alpine 
Meadows of Lake Tahoe, California, acquired 80% of the common 
stock of GPCC and assumed responsibility for the operations in 
return for an investment of $1,300,000 to pay remaining 
liabilities. United Park relinquished its ownership in GPCC, 
but retained its interest in all outstanding sale and lease 
agreements. The ski leases were amended to provide for two 2 0-
year extension periods at increased royalty rates. Current 
interest on the GPCC land purchase agreement was waived and the 
payment dates of the indebtedness and land sale agreements were 
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extended. [Amended Complaint J 62, R. 2790-93; R. 7921 at 127, 
7953 at 73-74; R. 6373; 7954 at 55, 144] 
13. The Memorandum of Agreement was expressly 
conditioned upon United Park obtaining approval of the 
transaction from its stockholders. Thereafter, United Park 
submitted a Proxy Statement dated September 2, 1975 to its 
stockholders and a special meeting of stockholders was held on 
October 7, 1975.! A copy of the Proxy Statement is attached 
hereto as Appendix A. [Amended Complaint flf 68 and 69, R. 2796-
99] The Proxy Statement set forth the details of the 
contemplated transactions, including a description of the 
property, stock and other assets to be exchanged. 
14. At the October 7, 1975 stockholders1 meeting, the 
proposed transaction was discussed. Prior to the meeting, 
Jerome Gartner, an attorney representing a minority stockholder, 
had written to the Board of Directors of United Park and 
complained about the fairness of the transaction. A copy of the 
letter is attached hereto as Appendix B. On October 6, 1975, 
Miles P. Romney, president of United Park, sent a telegram to 
Jerome Gartner stating that the United Park directors had 
considered his objections but had concluded it was in the best 
interests of United Park to agree to the proposed restructuring. 
A copy of the telegram is attached hereto as Appendix C. The 
1
 These events followed a preliminary discussion of the 
restructuring held at the May 27, 1975 annual meeting of United 
Park's shareholders. 
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shareholders at the meeting were advised of the Gartner letter 
and that the letter asserted that the proxy statement did not 
sufficiently inform the shareholders of the nature of the 
proposed transaction and that it would be detrimental to the 
best interests of United Park, After discussion, the United 
Park stockholders voted 96.4% in favor of approving the 
transaction with 2.8% against and 1.8% abstaining. [Amended 
Complaint 5fl 70 and 74, R. 2799-800 and 2800-01; Clark Wilson 
Depo., pp. 139-142, R. 7930, and Ex. 8] 
D. Subsequent Reports to United Park Stockholders, 
15. At all relevant times, United Park has been a 
public company subject to the reporting requirements of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Accordingly, United Park has 
filed quarterly and annual reports with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. In addition, United Park has sent to its 
stockholders each year an annual report with accompanying 
financial statements. These reports and financial statements 
fully disclosed the 1971 and 1975 transactions from which 
stockholders and any other interested persons could review and 
make informed decisions in regard to the 1971 and 1975 
transactions. The 1975 transactions and the results of GPCCs 
operations were also discussed in stockholders1 meetings and 
among the directors over the years. [Sears Aff. f 6, R. 4 052; 
Steele Aff. f 5, R. 4376] 
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16. At all relevant times both United Park and GPCC 
have been audited by "Big Eight" accounting firms. At no time 
have the auditors raised any question concerning the 1971 or 
1975 transactions, including the fairness of those transactions, 
the valuations of assets or the disclosures made to 
stockholders. [Wilson Depo., pp. 185-186, R. 7930; Volk Depo., 
p. 44, R. 7953] 
17. During the period of time that ARCO was a 
stockholder of United Park, United Park's Board of Directors 
consisted of seven members until 1981 after which the Board 
consisted of six members. ARCO had the power to and did in fact 
elect only two of the board members until 1982. ASARCO was also 
entitled to and did in fact elect only two members of the United 
Park board. [Amended Complaint f 18, R. 2767-68; Wilson Depo., 
p. 34, R. 7930] 
E. Management of United Park by Cimarron Corp. 
18. In October 1980, Cimarron Corp., a company entirely 
unrelated to ARCO or ASARCO, which owned a small block of United 
Park stock, acquired an option to purchase all of ARCO's stock 
in United Park. As part of the option agreement, ARCO agreed 
to, and did, vote its stock to elect two nominees of Cimarron to 
the United Park board. [Sears Aff. f 2, R. 4050-51] 
19. Wheeler M. Sears was the President, a director and 
stockholder of Cimarron and, in January 1981, was elected 
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President and a director of United Park. During 1981, Hugh J. 
Leach, Vice President, Western Operations of Cleveland Cliffs 
Iron Mining Co, and a consulting mining engineer, who was also 
independent of ARCO or ASARC0, was elected to the Board of 
Directors. Mr. Leach continues to serve on the United Park 
Board today. [Sears Aff. f 3, R. 4051] 
20. In 1981, Cimarron proposed a merger with United 
Park. That merger attempt was voted down by the United Park 
stockholders, led by Bamberger, despite the unanimous backing of 
the board of directors. ARCO voted with Bamberger against the 
merger. ASARCO and Cimarron voted for the merger. [Sears Aff. 
I 9, R. 4054] 
F. Independent Directors and Officers of United Park. 
21. At all relevant times prior to 1981, there were at 
least three members of the United Park board who were wholly 
independent of either ARCO or ASARCO. These independent 
directors included Harold J. Steele, then President of First 
Security Bank of Utah, N.A., who served from 1969 to 1978; Sid 
N. Cornwall, Vice President of United Park and retired from the 
law firm of VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy who served from 
1965 to 1968 and from 1969 to 1979; Miles Romney, a mining 
consultant and former director of the Utah Mining Association, 
who served from 1967 to 1980; Hugh J. Leach who served from 1979 
to the present; and Wheeler M. Sears, President and a Director 
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of Cimarron Corporation, who served from 1980 to 1985. [Edwards 
Aff., Ex. A., R. 4105-14; Sears Aff. ff 3, 11 and 12, R. 4051, 
4055-57] 
22. In addition to the independent directors, Wheeler 
Sears, President from 1981 to 1985, was independent of any 
office with ARCO and ASARC0, as was the Secretary-Treasurer, E. 
L. Osika (the father of E. L. Osika, Jr., a present member of 
the United Park Board), Miles P. Romney, President of the 
Company, and Sid N. Cornwall, Vice President of the Company. 
Mr. Osika, together with Clark Wilson, ran the day-to-day 
operations of United Park. [Edwards Aff., R. 4105-7; Osika 
Depo, pp. 22-23, R. 7944] 
23. In early 1982, two employees of ARCO, Herbert M. 
Weed and Clark L. Wilson, served on the six member Board of 
Directors of United Park. Mr. Weed retired from his employment 
with ARCO in April 1982 and thereafter remained on the board at 
the request and nomination of Cimarron Co. and its President, 
Wheeler M. Sears, who also served as President of United Park. 
Mr. Wilson, ARCO's only other nominee on the United Park board, 
retired from his employment in October of 1982 and was replaced 
by Ivan Yerger, Vice President of Cimarron Corporation, after 
which time no representatives or employees of ARCO served on the 
United Park board. [Sears Aff. 55 11 and 12, R. 4055-57; David 
W. Bernolfo Depo p. 29, R. 7933; Clark Wilson Depo pp.16-18, R. 
7930] 
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G. Sale of ARCO and ASARCO Shares to Loeb. 
24. Cimarron Corp. never exercised its option to 
purchase ARCO's shares in United Park. In 1985, ARCO and ASARCO 
sold their shares in United Park to Loeb, a large international 
investment banking firm headquartered in New York. Loeb's 
shares together with those held by Bamberger now constitute 
40.7% of United Park's common stock. [United Park 1985 Annual 
Report and 10K; R. 5834-73 at 5846] 
25. It is only since the acquisition of control of 
United Park by the Loeb-Bamberger group that any challenges have 
been raised to the 1975 transactions. [Sears Aff. f 6, R. 4052] 
VI. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. United Park's claims against ARCO and ASARCO for 
breach of fiduciary duty and negligence in connection with the 
1975 transactions are barred by the three year statute of 
limitations contained in Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-27 because 
those actions occurred thirteen years and more prior to the 
filing of the Amended Complaint. The statute of limitations 
commenced running in 1975 and continued to run because at that 
time and at all times since then there were independent 
directors and shareholders of United Park who knew or should 
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have known of the possible claims against ARCO and ASARCO and at 
the very least were on inquiry notice of the alleged wrongdoing. 
2. Loeb and Bamberger are barred under the Bangor Punta 
doctrine from using their control of United Park to seek a 
windfall by suing ARCO and ASARCO — the very entities from 
which Loeb acquired at fair value its United Park stock. To 
allow Loeb and Bamberger to use their control position to 
attempt to recover millions of dollars from ARCO and ASARCO for 
transactions occurring long before Loeb acquired control would 
enable Loeb to receive far more than the benefit of its bargain 
with ARCO and ASARCO. In the alternative, any recovery would 
have to go directly to shareholders who owned stock in United 
Park at the time of the alleged wrongs and not to United Park 
where any funds recovered could be used by Loeb for its benefit. 
3. ARCO and ASARCO are not responsible for the alleged 
negligence or breach of fiduciary duty by employees which it 
nominated to the Board of United Park. There was no evidence 
that ARCO or ASARCO dictated the actions of these directors who 
had a non-delegable duty to United Park. 
4. The district court did not abuse its discretion in 
refusing United Park's belated request for additional discovery. 
United Park had already conducted extensive discovery over a 
period of more than two years, no attempt had been made to 
conduct further discovery during the four months preceding 
hearing of the motion, the discovery which United Park sought to 
obtain was irrelevant to the bases upon which ARCO's and 
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ASARCOfs Motion was made, or at best merely cumulative, and 
United Park did not comply with Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure by specifying the information it hoped to elicit 
through further discovery and explaining its relevance to the 
issues raised by the motions. 
VII. 
ARGUMENT 
A. UNITED PARKfS CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
United Park sought recovery against ARCO and ASARCO on 
only two purported theories, breach of fiduciary duty and 
negligence. Essentially, United Park alleged that ARCO and 
ASARCO, acting in concert, controlled United Park and caused 
United Park to enter into the 197 5 restructuring of GPCC and 
obtain stockholder approval of that transaction through a 
misleading proxy statement. 
The alleged wrongs committed by ARCO and ASARCO occurred 
between 1974 and October 1975, when United Park's stockholders 
gave overwhelming approval to the 197 5 restructuring. Yet, the 
Amended Complaint was not filed naming ARCO and ASARCO as 
Defendants until June 1988, almost 13 years after the last 
alleged wrongful act complained of by United Park and two years 
after the initial suit was commenced. Therefore, this lawsuit 
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is obviously barred by the three-year statute of limitations 
contained in Utah Code Ann., Sec. 78-12-27 unless United Park 
can somehow toll the running of the statute of limitations until 
at least June of 1984, almost nine years after the last alleged 
wrongful act took place. On the basis of the undisputed facts 
before the district court, the court correctly decided that 
United Park had not met this substantial burden and dismissed 
the Amended Complaint. 
United Park argues in its Brief that the running of the 
statute of limitations was tolled until 1985 because ARCO and 
ASARCO controlled United Park through its board of directors. 
Plaintiff submitted no factual basis for that assertion 
and the undisputed evidence is to the contrary. Nevertheless, 
even if the assertion were true, the statute of limitations was 
not tolled because at all relevant times United Park had 
independent directors and stockholders who were on inquiry 
notice with respect to the claims against ARCO and ASARCO. 
1. To Toll the Statute of Limitations, Plaintiff Must 
Allege and Show That There Were No Informed Stockholders or 
Independent Directors Who Could Have Induced United Park to Sue. 
To toll the statute of limitations, a plaintiff must 
allege and show full, complete and exclusive control of the 
corporation by the wrongdoers so that the possibility that an 
informed stockholder or director could have induced the 
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corporation to sue is negated. See, e.g.. Mosesian v. Peat 
Marwick Mitchell & Co.. 727 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1984); Armstrong 
v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1983); International Railways 
of Central America v. United Fruit Co., 373 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 
1967); Interlake Porsche & Audi, Inc. v. Bucholz, 728 P.2d 597 
(Wash.App. 1986). 
For example, in International Railways of Central 
America v. United Fruit Co. , supra, the plaintiff corporation 
brought an antitrust and breach of contract action against the 
defendant which had controlled the election of plaintiff's nine 
directors for many years. Defendant moved for Summary Judgment 
based in part upon the statute of limitations. Plaintiff 
contended that the statute did not start to run on any of the 
antitrust claims until 1962 when defendant had relinquished its 
control of the corporation. 
The Second Circuit determined that the statute of 
limitations had not been tolled and that the action was barred 
and granted Summary Judgment. The court held that plaintiff had 
failed to carry its burden of negating the possibility of suit 
against the corporation while defendant was in control because 
there were three independent directors on the nine member board. 
After reviewing a number of other authorities, the Second 
Circuit observed: 
One principle emerging with some clarity is 
that a plaintiff who seeks to toll the statute 
on the basis of domination of a corporation has 
the burden of showing "a full, complete and 
exclusive control in the directors or officers 
charged." [Citation omitted] Such control was 
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found, for example in Adams v. Clarke. 22 F.2d 
957 (9 Cir. 1917), where all the directors were 
accused of wrongdoing and held a majority of the 
capital stock. . . . This principle must mean 
at least that once the facts giving rise to 
possible liability are known, the plaintiff must 
effectively negate the possibility that an 
informed stockholder or director could have 
induced the corporation to sue. And here we 
think IRCA fails. [373 F.2d at 414] 
The court went on to conclude: 
Since IRCA has not met its burden of 
demonstrating that, after the election of the 
three independent directors in 1959, UF had such 
"full, complete and exclusive control" as to 
rule out the possibility of a corporate suit 
against it, on the demand of a stockholder or 
director, for antitrust violations the facts 
giving rise to which had become well-known, any 
tolling of the statute ended at least by that 
time. [373 F.2d at 416] 
Similarly, in Interlake Porsche & Audi, Inc. v. Bucholz, 
supra, a minority stockholder brought a derivative action on 
behalf of the corporate automobile dealership seeking the profit 
from the majority stockholder who had bought a company-owned 
automobile for $6,500 and then sold it for $40,000. The court 
held that the lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitations 
because one officer and director of the corporation had 
knowledge of facts sufficient to put him on inquiry which could 
have led to the discovery of the alleged fraud. The court 
stated: 
Actual knowledge of the fraud will be 
inferred if the aggrieved party, by the exercise 
of due diligence, could have discovered it. The 
same rule applies in an action for fraud 
involving a fiduciary relation. 
# # # 
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Here Kreybig knew facts in 1979 which, by 
the exercise of due diligence, could have led to 
discovery of the alleged fraud, . . . As an IPA 
officer and director, Kreybig had knowledge 
which is imputed to the corporation. [728 P.2d 
at 607] 
In Armstrong v. McAlpin, supra, plaintiffs sued 14 
corporations, three firms, three partnerships and ten 
individuals alleging fraud under the securities laws. 
Plaintiffs sought to toll the statute of limitations on the 
basis that defendants had dominated and controlled the 
corporation during the relevant time period. The Second Circuit 
affirmed the dismissal of the Complaint because the record 
showed there were independent directors on the corporation's 
board which had not taken part in the wrongful acts and were not 
dominated and controlled by the wrongdoers. The court also 
noted that the alleged wrongdoers were separate and distinct 
from each other and that there was no financial connection 
between the companies. The court concluded that plaintiffs had 
failed to meet their burden to show that the defendants had 
"full, complete and exclusive control" of the corporation. 
In Curtis v. Connly, 257 U.S. 260, 42 S.Ct. 100 (1921), 
the United States Supreme Court held that the limitations period 
had run on the corporation's claim because any of three 
independent directors could have ascertained the alleged wrongs 
from an inspection of the corporate records. 257 U.S. at 262-
63. The court explained: "A single director like a single 
stockholder could proceed in the courts." Id. at 264. 
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Under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23.1, which 
allows stockholder derivative suits, any United Park stockholder 
could have enforced the rights of United Park. Rule 2 3.1 was 
specifically designed to allow a stockholder to bring Ma claim 
for relief which is owned by the stockholder's corporation.11 
See Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636, 638 (Utah 
1980) . Included in claims that can be brought derivatively are 
actions for "liability of corporate officers or majority 
shareholders for mismanagement, to recover corporate assets and 
related claims." 3B Moore's Federal Practice f 23.1.16[1] at 
23.1-47 (1987); See also Berqeson v. Life Insurance Corp. of 
America, 265 F.2d 227, 231-32 (10th Cir. 1959) (allowing 
stockholder derivative suit under Utah law against corporate 
officers and directors for breach of fiduciary duty). Thus, any 
individual United Park stockholder or director who was a 
stockholder could have brought an action in 1975 against ARCO 
and ASARCO.2 
2
 A few courts have stated in dicta that the statute of 
limitations should be tolled as long as the wrongdoers maintain a 
majority of the board of directors. See, e.g., Federal Savings & 
Loan Ins. Co. v. Williams, 599 F.Supp 1184 (D. Md. 1984). These 
cases ignore the ability of independent stockholders and directors 
to bring suit on behalf of the corporation. In any event, even if 
this standard were to be adopted, this action would still be barred 
because it is undisputed that ARCO and ASARCO did not nominate a 
majority of the board after April of 1982. (See pp. 28-29, infra) 
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2. United Park at All Times Had Independent Directors 
and Shareholders, 
ARCO and ASARCO only owned 31% of United Park, At all 
relevant times, there were thousands of independent stockholders 
having no connection with ARCO and ASARCO. This included the 
Bamberger Companies who have owned substantial stock in United 
Park since 1953. David W. Bernolfo, who became President of 
United Park in 1985 at which time he allegedly discovered the 
claims against ARCO and ASARCO, was affiliated with and was a 
director of the Bamberger Companies in 1975 and thereafter. [R. 
7933 at 66-67] 
Although the plaintiff in its Amended Complaint alleged 
that ARCO and ASARCO each appointed two directors to the United 
Park Board, the plaintiff failed to allege that ARCO and ASARCO 
dominated or controlled the selection or decisions of the three 
independent members of the United Park Board. 
The plaintiff alleged in its Amended Complaint: 
During their long period of control, Anaconda 
and ASARCO each elected two of their respective 
representatives, employees, officers, or attorneys 
to the seven-man Board of Directors of United Park, 
thereby controlling the Board of Directors of 
United Park. The so-called outside directors 
elected to the Board of United Park were usually 
individuals with prior or existing business or 
professional relationships with Anaconda, such as 
attorneys, bankers or mining consultants. [Para. 
18, R. 2767-68] 
Until April of 1982, two of ARCO's employees served on 
United Park's Board, as did two of ASARCO's employees. However, 
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during the entire relevant period of time, including the years 
1974 and 1975 when the alleged wrongdoing occurred, there were 
always at least three independent directors on the United Park 
Board: 
Sid Cornwall 
Retired Partner, Van Cott, 
Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy 
Miles P. Romney 
Former President of the 
Utah Mining Association 
Harold J. Steele 
President First Security Bank 
Wheeler M. Sears 
President of Cimarron 
Corporation 
Hugh J. Leach 
Vice President 
Western Operations of 
Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co, 
April 1969 to 
December 1980 
July 1970 to 
December 1980 (died) 
April 1969 to 
June 1978 
January, 1981 to 
August, 1985 
December, 1981 to 
present 
[R. 4109-14] 
The plaintiff United Park did not allege in the Amended 
Complaint, let alone produce any evidence, that the above-named 
independent directors were in any way dominated, controlled or 
brow-beaten by ARCO or ASARCO. Most telling, United Park did 
not sue any of the directors — not even those allegedly 
controlled by ARCO and ASARCO. 
Not only were there always at least three independent 
directors on the United Park Board, but after April, 1982, ARCO 
and ASARCO nominees did not even constitute a majority of United 
Park's Board of Directors. Herbert M. Weed, an employee of 
ARCO, served on the United Park board until April of 1982, when 
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he retired from his employment with ARCO, He remained on the 
United Park Board at the request and nomination of Cimarron 
Corporation by its President, Wheeler M. Sears. ARCO's only 
other director on the United Park Board, Clark Wilson, retired 
shortly thereafter in October, 1982 and was replaced by Ivan 
Yerger, Vice President of Cimarron Corporation. 
David Bernolfo, President of United Park and Bamberger, 
testified in his deposition (taken before United Park decided to 
sue ARCO and ASARCO) that ARCO had no representation on the 
Board after Sears was elected. [Bernolfo Depo., p. 29, R. 7933] 
In fact, after Bamberger and Loeb took control of United Park, 
Bernolfo wrote a letter dated May 14, 1985 to David Marshall of 
Ameribass Realty in Philadelphia touting United Park. In that 
letter, Bernolfo stated that, "In 1981 [Wheeler] Sears obtained 
an option on Atlantic Richfield's block at $5.56 per share. 
With this option he was able to gain control of the Board." [R. 
4006] 
Thus, because there were independent directors and 
stockholders at the time of the 1975 transactions and 
thereafter, there is simply no basis for tolling the statute of 
limitations in this case. Nevertheless, even if the statute 
were initially tolled, it would have started running by 1981 
when Cimarron and Wheeler Sears took over management of United 
Park. The very latest the statute of limitations could have 
commenced running in this case under any view of the matter is 
April 1982, when ARCO and ASARCO nominees no longer constituted 
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a majority of United Park's Board. The Amended Complaint was 
not filed until June 1988, over six years later. Accordingly, 
the claims against ARCO and ASARCO are barred by the three-year 
statute of limitations contained in Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-
27.3 
United Park attempts to avoid the clear legal 
consequences of the fact that there were always independent 
directors on the United Park Board by challenging the 
independence of some of those directors. Thus, United Park 
argues that Sid Cornwall was not independent because before his 
retirement in 1969, six years before the complained of 
transactions, he was a member of the firm of Van Cott, Bagley, 
Cornwall & McCarthy which represented ARCO and other parties. 
Plaintiff argues that Wheeler Sears, President of Cimarron 
Corporation, which took control of United Park in 1981, and Ivan 
Yerger, Vice President of Cimarron Corporation, were not 
independent directors because Cimarron had an option to purchase 
ARCOfs stock and because Sears wanted to merge United Park into 
Cimarron until Bamberger, ARCO and other shareholders 
3
 United Park did not argue below or in its Brief that the 
filing of the Amended Complaint relates back to the date of the 
filing of the original Complaint in May 1986. In any event, it is 
well settled that the relation-back doctrine does not apply unless 
the Plaintiff can show an "identity of interest" between the 
original parties and those added by the amendment. Doxey-Layton 
Co. v. Clark, 548 P. 2d 902 (Utah 1976) . The Utah Supreme Court has 
made it clear that there is not an identity of interest sufficient 
to apply the relation-back doctrine unless the parties are so 
closely related that notice of the action to one serves as notice 
to the other. Mere privity of contract is not sufficient. Perry 
v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 217 (Utah 1984). 
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successfully defeated that merger in 1981. United Park also 
claims Harold J. Steele, President of First Security Bank, was 
not independent because Alpine Meadows of Tahoe, Inc., who 
became the sole owner of GPCC after 1975, guaranteed repayment 
of a loan from the bank. Finally, United Park argues that Miles 
Romney was not independent because he had had unspecified 
relationships with ARCO and ASARCO. 
As indicated previously, United Park, in its Amended 
Complaint, did not allege as it was required to do to toll the 
running of the statute of limitations that ARCO or ASARCO 
dominated or controlled the independent directors. Furthermore, 
the plaintiff did not produce any evidence in the court below 
that ARCO or ASARCO had any power to or did in fact dominate or 
control Cornwall, Romney, Steele, Sears, or Yerger. The fact 
that these directors may have had some interests in common with 
ARCO or ASARCO or had some relationship with those companies is 
irrelevant.4 The issue is not whether ARCO or ASARCO and some of 
the directors had interests in common or had relationships — 
indeed, it would be unusual for that not to be the case; the 
issue is whether ARCO and ASARCO were able to dominate and 
4
 United Park does not even attempt to enlighten the court 
as to just what it was about these relationships which allegedly 
endangered the directors1 independence. For example, what possible 
bearing does the fact that Cimarron had an option to acquire ARCO's 
stock have on the independence of Sears and Yerger? Cimarron had 
a written contract entitling it to acquire the stock. Cimarron 
would not lose its option by suing ARCO. If anything, a successful 
suit against ARCO would have only enhanced the value of Cimarron's 
option. 
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control these directors by dictating their actions and their 
votes. 
For example, in Kaplan v. Centex Corp. , 284 A. 2d 119, 
123 (Dela. 1971), the court observed: 
"Control" and "domination" are here used in 
the ordinary meaning of the words and they may be 
exercised directly or through nominees. But, at 
minimum, the words imply (in actual exercise) a 
direction of corporate conduct in such a way as to 
comport with the wishes or interests of the 
corporation (or persons) doing the controlling. 
Similarly, in Terrydale Liquidating Trust v. Barness, 
611 F.Supp 1006, 1022 (D.C.N.Y. 1984), the court stated: 
In order to sustain a claim of domination and 
control, a party must allege facts "manifesting fa 
direction of corporate conduct in such a way as to 
comport with the wishes or interests of the 
corporation (or persons) doing the controlling.'" 
[Citations omitted] ("[C]ontrol . . . means the 
possession, direct or indirect, of the power to 
direct or cause the direction of the management and 
policies of a person, whether through the ownership 
of voting securities, by contract or otherwise"). 
See also Fry v. Trump, 681 F.Supp 252, 256 (D.N.J. 1988). 
In the present case, United Park failed to allege and 
failed to come forward with any evidence that ARCO or ASARCO 
dominated or controlled any of these directors. The evidence in 
fact was exactly to the contrary. For example, ARCO voted 
against the merger between Cimarron and United Park. Yet, the 
United Park Board was in favor of the merger. Sears caused 
Cimarron to vote for the merger and worked very hard in his 
unsuccessful attempt (opposed by Bamberger) to have the merger 
approved by the stockholders. 
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Finally, in a desperate effort to somehow escape the 
consequences of the fact there were independent directors, 
United Park argues, without one supporting piece of evidence, 
that Sid Cornwall and Miles Romney were "implicated in the 
wrongdoing" because they approved the prospectus prepared by 
United Park's attorneys and were involved as directors in 
obtaining stockholder approval of the transactions. This claim 
was not raised below until United Park threw it out in passing 
at the oral argument on the Summary Judgment motions and there 
is not even a hint in the Amended Complaint or the record that 
these gentlemen (one of whom, Romney, is now dead and the other, 
Cornwall, incapacitated) directed what information was included 
by the company attorneys in the prospectus or made any effort to 
hide anything or did anything else wrong. The only conclusion 
the record allows is that these gentlemen honorably served 
United Park as officers and directors for many years. 
3. At the Very Least, the Independent Directors and 
Stockholders Were On Inquiry Notice of the Alleged Claim Against 
ARCO and ASARCO. 
United Park erroneously argues that the independent 
directors and stockholders of United Park did not have knowledge 
of all facts giving rise to a claim against ARCO and ASARCO and 
that when a plaintiff should have discovered its claims is a 
factual issue which was not appropriate for summary judgment. 
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ARCO and ASARCO have no quarrel with the proposition that in 
many instances the issue of when a claim should be discovered is 
a question of fact which cannot be decided on a summary judgment 
motion. However, United Park's implication that courts have not 
decided the issue on summary judgment is simply not correct and 
the undisputed facts of this case required that summary judgment 
be granted. 
In Stewart v. K & S Co. , . 591 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1979), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated the applicable law: 
[W]here there is a fiduciary relationship, 
such as between corporate officers and a 
stockholder, the statute of limitations does not 
begin to run until the stockholder discovers, or in 
the exercise of reasonable care should discover, 
that there is a wrong to be complained of; . . . 
(footnote omitted). 
It is not necessary that a plaintiff know all or even 
substantially all of the facts that show that he has a claim. 
If a plaintiff has facts sufficient to put him on inquiry, the 
statute of limitations begins to run. In Koulis v. Standard Oil 
Co. of Cal.. 746 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Utah App. 1987), the Utah 
Court of Appeals stated: 
[I]f one is fully informed of such facts and 
information as would put a person of ordinary 
intelligence and prudence upon inquiry, and one 
makes no inquiry, then he or she is deemed to have 
discovered all that would have been revealed, and 
the running of the statute of limitations 
commences. [Gibson v. Jensen, 48 Utah 244, 158 P. 
426, 427 (1916); Haslem v. Ottosen, 689 P.2d 27, 30 
(Utah 1984). The complaining party does not have 
to have actual notice of the alleged fraud. Mason 
v. Laramie Rivers Co. . 490 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Wyo. 
1971). 
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The test for when a party should have known of facts 
sufficient to indicate that a wrong has taken place is an 
objective one. The question in the present case is when an 
independent director of United Park or an independent 
stockholder had notice of facts which, with due diligence, would 
have led to knowledge of the claim. Hunt v. American Bank & 
Trust of Baton Rouge, La., 606 F.Supp 1348 (N.D. Ala. 1985); 
Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 88 (2nd Cir. 1983); Stewart 
v. K & S Co.. Inc.. 591 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1979); Jones Mining 
Co. v. Cardiff Mining & Milling Co., 191 P. 426 (Utah 1920) . 
Where a person has knowledge of facts which would lead a person 
of reasonable prudence to investigate further, that person is 
charged with notice of all facts which a reasonable inquiry 
would uncover. Armstrong v. McAlpin, supra, at 88; Michelsen 
v. Penney, 135 F.2d 409, 417 (2nd Cir. 1943)1 
In Webb v. R.Q.A. General, Inc., 152 Utah Adv.Rep. 12 
(January 10, 1991), recently decided by the Utah Court of 
Appeals, the defendant filed a counterclaim alleging that the 
plaintiff had breached his fiduciary duty to the corporation by 
usurping a corporate opportunity in not revealing to the board 
of directors the details of his arrangement for the purchase of 
stock in a competitor. The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed a 
summary judgment dismissing the claim on the basis of the 
statute of limitations because some board members knew of the 
transaction more than three years prior to the filing of the 
suit. In this regard, the court observed: 
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It is not necessary that they then learned all 
the details of that transaction, but only that they 
had enough information to be on notice of a 
possible wrong. 
152 Utah Adv.Rep. at 14. 
The Tenth Circuit in State of Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, 
Rail, Barber & Ross, 651 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cir. 1987), in 
affirming a summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff 
should have discovered its claim years before it was filed, 
noted that numerous cases have decided the discovery issue by 
summary judgment. 
Utilizing the objective test, the court in Hunt v. 
American Bank & Trust of Baton Rouge, La. , supra, granted 
summary judgment dismissing the complaint because the 
stockholders had actual knowledge of some of the claimed fraud 
and had notice of facts which with continuing due diligence 
would have led them to actual knowledge of the other claimed 
fraud. In granting summary judgment, the Hunt court observed: 
The test for when the statute begins to run is 
an objective one. The plaintiff's actual knowledge 
need not be proved. At that time when the 
plaintiff knew or should have known of facts 
sufficient to indicate that the fraud had taken 
place, the statute begins to run. Thus, for our 
purposes, the inquiry must concentrate on when the 
holder of the claim had either actual knowledge of 
the alleged violation or notice of facts which, 
with the exercise of due diligence, would have led 
to actual knowledge thereof. 
606 F.Supp at 1354 (Emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Jensen v. Snellings, 841 F.2d 600, 606-607 
(5th Cir. 1988), the Fifth Circuit granted summary judgment 
36 
dismissing a federal securities law claim on the basis it was 
barred by the statute of limitations: 
Under federal law, the limitations period 
commences when Mthe aggrieved party has either 
knowledge of the violation or notice of facts, 
which, in the exercise of due diligence, would have 
led to actual knowledge" thereof. [Citations 
omitted]. Thus, the limitations period applicable 
to a cause of action for fraud . . . does not begin 
to run until the plaintiff discovers, or in the 
exercise of reasonable diligence should discover, 
the alleged fraudulent conduct. [Citations 
omitted]. The requisite knowledge that a plaintiff 
must have to begin the running of the limitations 
period "is merely that of 'the facts forming the 
basis of his cause of action, f . . . not that of 
the existence of the cause of action itself." 
* * * 
The requirement of diligent inquiry imposes 
an affirmative duty upon the potential plaintiff. 
Plaintiff is not permitted a "leisurely discovery 
of the full details of the alleged scheme." 
[Citation omitted] A plaintiff who has learned of 
facts which would cause a reasonable person to 
inquire further must proceed with a reasonable and 
diligent investigation, and is charged with the 
knowledge of all facts such an investigation would 
have disclosed. . . . Our emphasis on the duty of 
due diligence comports with the policy underlying 
statutes of limitation. They are intended to 
ensure fairness to defendants against "claims that 
have been allowed to slumber . . . the right to be 
free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over 
the right to prosecute them." [Emphasis added] 
Id. at 606-07. 
Other cases in which summary judgment was granted 
determining the statute of limitations issue on the basis that 
the plaintiff was charged with inquiry notice as matter of law 
include, Maggio v. Gerard Freezer & Ice Co., 824 F.2d 123 (1st 
Cir. 1987); General Builders Supply Co v. River Hill Coal 
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Venture, 796 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1986); Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 676 
F.2d 1122, 1127 (6th Cir. 1982). 
(a) The Knowledge of the Independent Directors. 
At the very least, the independent directors of United 
Park have been on inquiry notice of the alleged claims against 
ARCO and ASARCO since 1975. The independent directors of United 
Park in 1975, Cornwall, Romney (who was also United Park's 
President) and Steele, knew the details of the 1975 
restructuring and had access to all of the records of United 
Park. Also, United Park directors immediately prior to the 
stockholder meeting of October 7, 1975 received a letter from 
Jerome Gartner which challenged the fairness of the 1975 Resort 
Agreements, and complained of the lack of information given to 
the stockholders and the misleading statements in the proxy 
material. The Gartner letter raised essentially the same 
complaints as United Park raises in this lawsuit. The Gartner 
letter stated: "the present proposal violates the directors1 
duties to the stockholders, especially minority stockholders, 
under state and common law equity and law." [Appendix B, 
Gartner letter, p. 8] 
Gartner in his letter demanded, among other things: 
1. That a revised proxy statement be issued 
"setting forth the fairness of the consideration to be 
received by the UPK stockholders." 
2. That the directors should "preserve the rights 
of the UPK stockholders to the valuable property being 
38 
abandoned in the proposed agreement set forth in the 
October 7th proxy statement." 
[Appendix B, Gartner letter pp. 1 and 2] 
Gartner complained that the Proxy Statement was 
misleading because it was possible for the directors "to provide 
the stockholders with the estimates of values of the ski resorts 
and component parts" and that the directors have available "a 
number of appraisals of valuation of the ski resort areas" 
including: 
a. Valuation report submitted for SBA loan in the 
1960fs; 
b. $150,000.00 study done by UA Group in 1970-71 
as precondition to closing the agreement; 
c. Valuations and appraisal provided to various 
lending banks by the UA Group as part of lending done 
1971- 1975; 
d. Proposals and valuation reports tendered to 
Morgan Guarantee Group for 1974 loans; 
e. Appraisal and valuation as part of UPK lending 
$700,000.00 to UA Group for ski resort in 1974; 
f. Financial statements 1971- 1975 from UA Group, 
GPCC, and the rest, showing prices received for house 
sites profits from sales, etc. 
[Appendix B, Gartner letter, p. 9] 
Gartner also claimed that the Proxy Statement was 
deficient because it did not "alert the stockholders to the 
following key facts." 
1. The original agreement ratified by the 
stockholders contemplated, in case of default, recovery 
of all the property, and its language and intent was 
greater than a mortgage position. 
2. Any estimate of the value of the various 
property rights being in effect abandoned is omitted. 
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If 6,000 acres were only leased, why should UPK part 
with them now as part of this arrangement? If the legal 
remedies are pursued and all the property returned, what 
are the potential gains? 
3. What is the security of the various lenders 
that they should receive most of the equity, 
particularly in regard to the UA Group? 
4. It is ignored that Park City has become one of 
the great ski resorts of the world, and its value and 
potential is much greater than when the agreement was 
first entered into in 1970. 
[Appendix B, Gartner letter pp. 8 and 9] 
United Park stipulated below that the Gartner letter was 
received by Cornwall, E.L. Osika and Romney, and that it was 
discussed by some of the members of the United Park Board of 
Directors prior to the October 7, 1975 stockholder meeting. [R. 
3652-53 at f 1] 
The fact that the Gartner letter was received and 
considered by the United Park Board of Directors is apparent 
from a telegram dated October 6, 1975 sent by Romney, President 
of United Park, to Gartner. The first three paragraphs of this 
telegram are as follows: 
We have your letters addressed to our Directors 
regarding the proposed restructuring of the balance 
sheet of Greater Park City Company. 
We have considered very carefully the matters set 
forth in your letters and appreciate your interest in 
the problems involved. The proposed arrangement was 
arrived at after careful consideration of other 
alternatives and after exhaustive studies. 
The proposal is the result of such studies and 
research and is believed by management to be in the best 
interests of the Company and all its stockholders. 
[Appendix C, R. 3672] 
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(b) The Knowledge of the Independent Stockholders. 
Even if there had been no independent directors with 
knowledge of the 1975 transactions, this action would 
nevertheless be barred because the independent United Park 
stockholders were also fully informed concerning the 
transactions. The September 2, 1975 Proxy Statement [Appendix 
A] sent to all United Park stockholders specifically included, 
among other things, the following information: 
1. One of United Park's remedies for GPCC's 
default was to take back all the property sold to GPCC 
which had not already been conveyed (2014 acres), retain 
all payments which GPCC had previously made and then 
take whatever action was appropriate for the operation 
of the ski properties and development and sale of the 
real property. However, management believed that such 
action may result in protracted and complex legal 
proceedings and would be detrimental to the interest of 
United Park. 
2. United Park owned 63.2 percent of the preferred 
stock and 39.4 percent of the common stock of GPCC which 
it acquired for $972,000.00 and which it was going to 
sell to GPCC and Alpine for a total of $2,000.00 
3. United Park was going to forgive approximately 
$250,000.00 in accrued interest owing from GPCC and 
extend the repayment terms. 
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4. The ski leases would be amended to provide 
options for two additional extensions of 20-years each 
with a small percentage increase in the revenue to be 
received by United Park. 
5. The fact that the present fair market value of 
the GPCC property was not being set forth was 
specifically brought to the attention of the 
stockholders. 
6. The principal assets which the other parties to 
the restructuring were receiving were discussed. 
United Park, however, asserts that the Board of 
Directors did not include in the Proxy Statement to the 
stockholders the value of the GPCC properties and other details 
concerning benefits which other parties were to receive under 
the restructuring. United Park argues in its Brief this 
constituted fraudulent concealment by ARCO and ASARCO (although 
no fraud or fraudulent concealment claims were alleged in the 
Amended Complaint against anyone) and that the statute of 
limitations was tolled until the Bernolfo-Loeb group first 
allegedly discovered the unfairness of the restructuring 
sometime after August 1985. United Park's argument ignores the 
record. 
There is no evidence that ARCO or ASARCO did anything to 
fraudulently conceal the value of the GPCC properties or other 
details of the transaction from the stockholders. In fact, even 
though the directors were not required to obtain stockholder 
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approval, the Board did so and disclosed the transactions to the 
stockholders, describing what United Park was receiving and what 
United Park was giving up in the transaction. United Park's 
claim — not anywhere contained in the Amended Complaint — that 
these disclosures were part of a scheme to hide the import of 
the transactions from the stockholders is unsupported by any 
evidence and is palpably absurd on its face. The fact that 
additional details were not included in the proxy is irrelevant. 
Mere silence is not enough to toll the statute of limitations. 
Rather, there "must be some trick or contrivance intended to 
exclude suspicion and prevent inquiry." Electric Power Board of 
Chattanooga v. Monsanto Co. , 879 F.2d 1368, 1377 (6th Cir. 
1989); Volk v. D.A. Davidson & Co., 816 F.2d 1406, 1415 (9th 
Cir. 1987); Vance v. Schulder, 547 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tenn. 1911); 
Tovrea Land & Cattle Co. v. Linsenmeyer, 412 P.2d 47, 63 (Ariz. 
1966). 
For example, in Volk, appellants contended that the 
general partner of the subject limited partnerships had failed 
to disclose to them certain geological reports known to the 
general partner. The court held that this did not constitute 
fraudulent concealment because there was no evidence that there 
were any affirmative steps to mislead appellants. The court 
stated: 
In some cases, the conduct of a defendant will 
toll the statute of limitations under the doctrine 
of fraudulent concealment. The doctrine is 
properly invoked only if a plaintiff establishes 
"affirmative conduct upon the part of the defendant 
which would, under the circumstances of the case, 
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lead a reasonable person to believe that he did not 
have a claim for relief." [Citations omitted] 
Appellants must demonstrate that they had neither 
actual nor constructive notice of the facts 
constituting their claims for relief. [Citation 
omitted] 
To invoke the doctrine in the complaint, 
appellants must plead with particularity the facts 
giving rise to the fraudulent concealment claim and 
must establish that they used due diligence in 
trying to uncover the facts. [Citations omitted] 
Appellees1 silence or passive conduct does not 
constitute fraudulent concealment. [816 F.2d at 
1415-1416] 
The cases cited by United Park in support of its 
fraudulent concealment argument are all distinguishable. 
For example, Rice v. Granite School District, 456 P.2d 
159 (Utah 1969) , relied upon by United Park, was not even a 
fraudulent concealment case. Rather, in Rice, the defendant's 
insurance adjuster represented to the plaintiff that her claim 
would be paid as soon as the amount was ascertained and 
affirmatively induced her not to file action. The Utah Supreme 
Court simply held that the defendant was therefore estopped from 
relying upon the statute of limitations. 
In Riddell v. Riddell Washington Corp., 866 F.2d 1480 
(D.C.Cir. 1989), the defendant affirmatively misrepresented to 
plaintiff that his stock had been independently appraised when 
in fact the value had been determined by an interested insider 
at substantially below the range at which an independent 
appraisal had shown. The court simply held that the statute of 
limitations did not commence to run until plaintiff discovered 
or should have discovered the falsity of that affirmative 
44 
misrepresentation. The court recognized, however, that mere 
silence is not enough to toll the statute of limitations and 
that "defendant must engage in some misleading, deceptive, or 
otherwise contrived action or scheme . . . that is designed to 
mask the existence of a cause of action." [866 F.2d at 1491] 
In Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181 
(Utah 1989), cited by United Park, plaintiffs testimony was that 
their doctor had misrepresented to them that tests demonstrated 
that their daughter's problems were the result of blood clots 
and were unrelated to anyone's negligence. Plaintiffs contended 
that they did not find out until years later that this 
representation was false and that in fact the child's injuries 
resulted from a delay in treating her. The court held a 
question of fact existed on the statute of limitations issue. 
In so ruling, the court noted that fraud must be pleaded with 
particularity and that a complaint containing mere conclusory 
allegations is insufficient to conclude dismissal or summary 
judgment. 
In this regard, ARCO and ASARCO were hardly in a 
position to conceal the approximate values of the Park City real 
estate. The assertion that anyone could conceal that the value 
of real estate in Park City had increased with the continued 
development of GPCC's ski resort is ludicrous. This information 
was generally known. Certainly inquiry of any real estate 
developer or appraiser in Park City would have revealed if there 
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had been any significant increase in real estate values from 
1970 to 1975. 
In addition to the detailed information contained in the 
Proxy Statement, stockholders who attended the October 7, 1975 
stockholder meeting that approved the 197 5 Resort Agreements 
also knew that one stockholder had obtained counsel, Jerome 
Gartner, who strenuously objected to the 197 5 restructuring on 
essentially the same grounds as complained of by United Park in 
the present case. United Park complains that only 18 
stockholders attended the October 7, 1975 stockholders meeting 
and that a majority of the stockholders were unaware of the 
Gartner letter. However, the defendants do not have to show 
that all stockholders were on notice, but only that one 
independent stockholder was on notice. The undisputed fact is 
that the 18 stockholders had available all the information in 
the Proxy Statement and were advised that the fairness of the 
transaction was being challenged in a formal objection by an 
attorney for one of the stockholders. 
United Park also asserts that the independent 
stockholders of United Park were not informed of the complete 
contents of the Gartner letter and that the United Park 
directors downplayed its significance. This argument is without 
merit. The stockholders were informed that one stockholder had 
obtained an attorney who had raised serious objections to the 
fairness of the restructuring, which objection was deemed of 
sufficient importance by the directors to be discussed at the 
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stockholders1 meeting. If stockholders wanted further 
information concerning the letter, they had a duty to make 
inquiry and could easily have discovered the complete contents 
of the letter. 
Moreover, United Park also ignores the documents in its 
own files which show that Mr. Gartner was not the only 
stockholder in 1975 who believed that the Proxy Statement raised 
red flags. A number of other letters were written to United 
Park by the outside shareholders in response to the September 2, 
1975 Proxy Statement. For example, Mr. Day L. Chase of Medina, 
Ohio called it a "boondoggle" and commented that: 
[i]t was interesting to note that an asset with 
sufficient book value to act as a tax deduction, 
now has absolutely no value. 
. . . 
Two new corporations born on the assets of a 
bankrupt. 
The ramifications are so deep, so insidious 
and unbelievable that, it could constitute a text 
for uncontrolled corporate maneuver. [R. 7250] 
Mr. Reuben L. King of Reidsville, North Carolina felt 
sufficiently ignorant of the "terms, legal claptrap arguments, 
evasions and loopholes involved in the Proxy Statement" that he 
signed under protest to preserve his rights to seek legal 
redress against the company if there "is any larceny, legal or 
illegal rascality or subterfuge involved." [R. 7251] 
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Mr. Ronald P. Hansen of Los Angeles, California recited 
a list of concerns he had from reviewing the Proxy Statement, 
including 
United Park's disposing of $972,000 worth of 
its stock for $2,000; 
the amendment of the ski leases to allow 
additional extensions to GPCC and restriction 
on United Park's right to sell certain 
properties; 
no mention of how GPCC would pay if it had no 
residential or commercial property development; 
no mention of increasing the interest rate to 
current rates. 
Mr. Hansen concluded that fl[i]n light of the above I am unable 
to understand, and voted my proxy accordingly, why you have not 
enforced collection of funds due . . . to UPK and proposed some 
other method of UPK development of UPK properties involved." 
[R. 7254] 
Mr. Gordon D. Stott of Mt. Kisco, New York stated that 
"even as a stockholder who has some knowledge of the background, 
I question whether sufficient background material is indeed 
present to permit share owners to pass judgment on such a 
complex situation." [R. 7256] 
Louis C. Perry of Webster Groves, Missouri wrote that 
"in order to assess the merits of the proposed transfer of 
assets, I need financial statements of the various companies 
designated to receive the several interests to be conveyed. [R. 
7257] 
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Finally, Mr. Gartner, in addition to the letter already 
quoted, wrote a two-paragraph letter addressed to the board of 
directors, which stated in pertinent part: 
The proposed irreparable and final action in 
selling off UPK's title and all rights to the Park 
City Ski Resort and invaluable water rights will 
remove forever one of the two main assets of UPK. 
The sole remaining asset of UPK will be the hope of 
income from the joint venture to develop the mine 
controlled by the two controlling shareholders, 
Anaconda and American Smelting and Refining 
Company. [R. 7260] 
The fact that the United Park stockholders were on 
notice in 1975 was admitted in testimony given by plaintiff's 
counsel, David K. Watkiss, at the disqualification hearing in 
the court below during his direct examination by his counsel: 
Q. Did there come a point when you considered naming 
ARCO or The Anaconda Company and ASARCO as 
defendants in this litigation? 
A. I will have to answer that this way. We talked 
about Anaconda and ASARCO from the beginning. I 
talked with Mr. Strachan here about them, in those 
discussions I have described, because Anaconda and 
ASARCO were the controlling stockholders and they 
dominated the board of directors with their people. 
And there had been charges leveled back in 1975 by 
people, in the records of the company, that the 
board had not protected the company's interests. 
I mean, this was a matter of common knowledge. 
A lawyer, at the time, in 1975, when they had the 
final stockholders meeting, as I recall it was a 
stockholders' meeting, where these agreements were 
presented, had sent a night letter to all of the 
board, which was in the records, challenging what 
they were doing, and claiming they were selling out 
the interests of the stockholders. So this was 
nothing new. 
[Emphasis added] [Hearing Transcript, June 1 and 2, 1989, p. 
242, R. 7969] 
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Furthermore, in 1980, Cimarron Corp., a corporation 
totally unrelated to ARCO or ASARCO, acquired stock in United 
Park and a further option to purchase all of ARCO's stock in 
United Park. In connection with those agreements, Wheeler M. 
Sears, President of Cimarron Corporation, was elected as 
President and a director of United Park in January 1981 and took 
over management of United Park. Mr. Sears and Cimarron Corp. 
had full knowledge concerning the 1971 and 1975 transactions. 
The subject of the 1975 restructuring of GPCC was frequently 
discussed among the officers and board members, including Mr. 
Sears. Yet Mr. Sears and Cimarron took no action with respect 
to those transactions nor did they seek to have United Park take 
action. 
The impact of the 197 5 Resort Agreements on United Park 
was obvious on its face. As David Bernolfo, President of United 
Park, testified in his deposition taken before the decision was 
made to name ARCO and ASARCO as defendants: 
. . . [W]hen I read the reorganization [within a 
week or two after he became President] I believed 
that on its face it was unfair to the mining 
company. And then we started — I started to get 
into the 1975 organization [sic] a number of ways. 
[Bernolfo Depo., p. 434] (Emphasis added) 
Bernolfofs mere reading of the 1975 restructuring 
agreement led him to investigate those transactions. These 
agreements and a number of other facts were before the 
independent directors of United Park and the stockholders, 
including the Bamberger Group and David Bernolfo, since 1975. 
50 
There is absolutely no reason why they could not have discovered 
the alleged claims years before the Bernolfo-Loeb group brought 
suit in 1988. The statute of limitations therefore bars United 
Park's claims against ARCO and ASARCO for nealiaence and breach 
of fiduciary duty. 
B. THIS SUIT IS ALSO BARRED BECAUSE LOEB WAS NOT A 
STOCKHOLDER UNTIL 1985 AND ACQUIRED ITS STOCK FROM 
THE ALLEGED WRONGDOERS. 
In 1985, Loeb purchased ARCO's and ASARCO's stock 
totalling 31.1% of United Park's outstanding shares. It is 
beyond dispute that the price paid by Loeb reflected the actual 
financial condition of United Park. United Park alleged below 
that the financial condition of United Park was in fact due in 
substantial part to the alleged, though unspecified, wrongdoings 
of the Defendants in this case. [Amended Complaint, 55 80 and 
87, R. 2804-05 and 2806] Accordingly, Loeb directly benefitted 
in the price that it paid for the United Park shares by the 
financial condition of United Park and by the very alleged acts 
which they now claim were wrongful. 
Loeb, together with the Bambergers, took control of 
United Park in 1985 and together they caused this action to be 
filed. Loeb even substantially financed this action by 
advancing loans to United Park to continue the maintenance of 
the suit. Thus, it is clear that Loeb seeks a windfall on its 
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shares by attempting to attack transactions which occurred a 
substantial period of time prior to its acquisition of stock in 
United Park. The principles of equity simply do not permit such 
double-dipping by speculators, nor do those principles permit 
the maintenance of litigation to benefit those not affected by 
the wrongs alleged. 
Accordingly, the lawsuit against ARCO and ASARCO is 
barred because Loeb was not a stockholder at the time the 
alleged mismanagement occurred and because Loeb acquired its 
stock from the alleged wrongdoers, ARCO and ASARCO. The leading 
case on this issue is Bangor Punta Operations v. Bangor and A.R. 
Co., 417 U.S. 703, 94 S.Ct. 2578 (1974). Bangor and Aroostook 
Railroad Co. ("BAR11) sought damages for mismanagement and other 
wrongs against Bangor Punta which previously owned approximately 
98% of BAR'S stock. In 1969, Bangor Punta, through a 
subsidiary, sold all of its stock to Amoskeag Co. which later 
acquired additional shares so that it owned more than 99% of 
BAR'S outstanding stock. 
The United States Supreme Court first noted that 
Amoskeag was the real party in interest and hence the actual 
beneficiary of any recovery and did not contend that it had not 
received full value for its purchase price or that the purchase 
transaction was tainted by fraud or deceit. Therefore, the Court 
concluded that any recovery on Amoskeag's part would constitute 
a windfall because it sustained no injury. In affirming the 
district court's granting of Summary Judgment dismissing BAR's 
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Complaint and reversing the Court of Appeals1 decision, the 
Supreme Court observed: 
The resolution of this issue depends upon 
the applicability of the settled principle of 
equity that a shareholder may not complain of 
acts of corporate mismanagement if he acquired 
his shares from those who participated or 
acquiesced in the allegedly wrongful 
transactions, [Citations omitted] This 
principle has been invoked with special force 
where a shareholder purchases all or 
substantially all the shares of a corporation 
from a vendor at a fair price, and then seeks to 
have the corporation recover against the vendor 
for prior corporate mismanagement. . . . Dean 
Pound, writing for the Supreme Court of 
Nebraska, observed that the shareholders of the 
plaintiff corporation in that case had sustained 
no injury since they had acquired their shares 
from the alleged wrongdoers after the disputed 
transactions occurred and had received full 
value for their purchase price thus any recovery 
on their part would constitute a windfall, for 
it would enable them to obtain funds to which 
they had no just title or claim. Moreover, it 
would in effect allow the shareholders to recoup 
a large part of the price they agreed to pay for 
their shares, notwithstanding the fact that they 
received all they had bargained for. Finally, 
it would permit the shareholders to reap a 
profit from wrongs done to others, thus 
encouraging further such speculation. [417 U.S. 
at 710-711] [Emphasis Added] | 
The Supreme Court in Bangor Punta also recognized that 
Amoskeag could not have brought suit itself because it did not 
own stock at the time of the alleged wrong and held that this 
requirement could not be avoided by the simple expedient of 
bringing the lawsuit in the name of BAR, saying: 
We are met with the argument, however, that 
since the present action is brought in the name 
of respondent corporations, we may not look 
behind the corporate entity to the true 
substance of the claims and the actual 
beneficiaries. The established law is to the 
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contrary. Although a corporation and its 
shareholders are deemed separate entities for 
most purposes, the corporate form may be 
disregarded in the interests of justice where it 
is used to defeat an overriding public policy. 
. Thus, where equity would preclude the 
shareholders from maintaining an action in their 
own right, the corporation would also be 
precluded. [417 U.S. at 713] 
Similarly, in Noland v. Barton, 741 F.2d 315 (10th Cir. 
1984), the plaintiffs purchased all the stock of Whitley Coal 
Co. in April 1979 and thereafter commenced suit against former 
officers and directors of the company for wrongful conversion of 
corporate assets and breach of fiduciary duty. The alleged 
wrongs occurred prior to plaintiffs1 stock purchase. The Tenth 
Circuit affirmed the dismissal of these claims on the basis that 
plaintiffs were not stockholders at the time of the alleged 
wrongs. The Tenth Circuit further upheld the District Court's 
refusal to allow amendment of the Complaint to name the 
corporation as a plaintiff on the basis that since plaintiffs 
were barred from bringing the lawsuit, the corporation was also 
precluded. 
In Court land Manor, Inc. v. Leeds, 347 A.2d 144 (Del.Ch. 
1975), a corporation brought suit against Mr. Leeds, a former 
President and substantial stockholder of the corporation. The 
corporation brought suit shortly after three individuals 
acquired control of the corporation. In denying recovery, the 
court observed: 
In effect, it is an argument that since 
Leeds duped the previous stockholder-directors 
into acquiescence through surreptitious conduct, 
and thus, perpetrated a fraud upon them, the 
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present majority stockholders, through the guise 
of the corporate entity, should be permitted to 
recover damages for themselves for wrongs 
committed against others. If plaintiff is 
correct in its theory that acquiescence was 
improperly obtained by Leeds, this no doubt 
played a large role in enabling the present 
shareholders to purchase substantially all the 
existing stock from the original shareholders 
for a fraction of what the latter paid for it. 
If they are permitted to now recover for wrongs 
committed to those from whom they acquired the 
majority interest at a deflated value, the 
present shareholders will reap the windfall that 
equity strives to preclude. [347 A.2d at 148] 
See, also. Ford Tank Maintenance Co. v. Ford, 203 NYS 2d 542 
(1960) ; In re. REA Express, Inc. Private Treble Damage etc., 412 
F.Supp. 1239 (E.D.Pa. 1976). 
The Bangor Punta rule is particularly applicable in the 
case at bar. For over 13 years, the stockholders of United 
Park, and specifically the stockholders in 1975, took no action 
whatsoever with respect to the complained of transactions. 
These stockholders included the Bamberger Group, who even in 
1975 was a substantial stockholder in United Park. Now, years 
after the fact, Loeb shows up on the scene with a ploy. It 
purchases ARCO and ASARCOfs stock at a price based upon the 
actual financial condition of United Park, and then tries to 
exact a windfall by suing ARCO and ASARCO on the basis that 
absent their alleged mismanagement, the financial worth of 
United Park and hence the value of its stock would have been 
higher. It is precisely this sort of windfall that Bangor Punta 
seeks to prevent. Loeb is precluded under Bangor Punta from 
utilizing its control of United Park to cause United Park to 
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commence suit against ARCO and ASARCO because Loeb would 
obviously be precluded from filing suit in its own name. 
United Park argues that the Bangor Punta doctrine only 
applies where a plaintiff has purchased all or substantially all 
of the company's stock from the wrongdoers and that here Loeb 
only purchased 31.1% of United Park stock from ARCO and ASARCO. 
United Park can cite no authority which supports this 
proposition, which flies directly in the face of the cases and 
the equitable rationale for the doctrine. 
No case has suggested that the Bangor Punta doctrine is 
limited to situations where a plaintiff has purchased all or 
substantially all of the companyfs stock. In fact, in In re 
REA Express Inc. Private Treble Damages, Etc., 412 F.Supp 1239, 
1255 (E.D.Pa. 1976), the court expressly rejected plaintiff's 
contention that because 2 0% of its stock was held by non-
defendants, Bangor Punta did not apply. 
The Bangor Punta doctrine is not based upon the amount 
of stock purchased, but upon the equitable principle that: 
"A stockholder may not complain of acts of 
corporate mismanagement if he acquired his shares 
from those who participated or acquiesced in the 
allegedly wrongful transactions." 
Bangor Punta, supra, All U.S. at 710. 
United Park also argues that it is a question of fact 
whether the price paid by Loeb for its shares from ARCO and 
ASARCO reflected the actual financial condition of United Park 
and the effect of the alleged wrongdoing of ARCO and ASARCO. 
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United Park argues in this regard that in 1975 United Park stock 
traded at or substantially below the $2.37 average price per 
share which Loeb paid for its stock. This fact is irrelevant. 
The relevant fact is that at the time Loeb purchased its stock 
from ARCO and ASARCO, Loeb knew very well what United Park's 
assets were and that those assets did not include the assets 
which had been given up in the 1975 GPCC restructuring. The 
price paid by Loeb for its stock obviously reflected the actual 
assets and financial condition of United Park in 1985 and United 
Park can show no evidence to the contrary. 
United Park contends that it is at least entitled to a 
prorata recovery for the benefit of stockholders other than 
Loeb. In the court below, ARCO and ASARCO argued, and the court 
agreed, that it would not be appropriate to allow this lawsuit 
to proceed for the benefit of minority stockholders who owned 
their stock back in the early 1970s when the alleged wrongs 
occurred absent some compelling showing that such stockholders 
who believed that ARCO and ASARCO committed wrongs exist and 
some compelling showing why no complaints were asserted by those 
stockholders over all these years. No such showing was ever 
made. Further, even if the lawsuit were to proceed, any 
recovery would have to go directly to the minority stockholders 
who were stockholders at the time of the alleged wrongdoing on 
a prorata basis and not to United Park, which could then use the 
monies received to benefit Loeb. See, e.g. Mathews v. Headley 
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Chocolate Co., 100 A. 645 (Maryland, 1917); Jannes v. Microwave 
Communications Inc., 385 F.Supp 759 (D.I11. 1974). 
Finally, United Park argues that the Bangor Punta 
doctrine does not preclude maintenance of this suit by Bamberger 
which was a stockholder in 1975. Although Bangor Punta does not 
bar a derivative suit by Bamberger not financed by United Park, 
Bangor Punta does bar Bamberger's joining with Loeb and then 
using this control position to bring suit in the name and at the 
expense of the corporation. 
C. ARCO AND ASARCO CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE 
ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF THE UNITED PARK DIRECTORS 
United Park seeks to hold ARCO and ASARCO liable for 
alleged mismanagement committed by members of United Parkfs 
Board of Directors in connection with the 1975 transactions on 
the purported basis that ARCO and ASARCO dominated and 
controlled the corporation. 
Initially, there is no substantial evidence in the 
record that ARCO and ASARCO acted jointly to control United 
Park. The evidence is just the opposite. For example, ASARCO 
voted in favor of a merger with Cimarron Corporation which was 
approved by the board, but ARCO voted against the merger. 
Moreover, ARCO and ASARCO themselves did not, and of 
course could not, serve on the Board of Directors. ARCO and 
ASARCO were just stockholders, holding approximately 18% and 13% 
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of the United Park stock, respectively. All ARCO and ASARCO did 
was to each cause the election of two members of the United Park 
board. ARCO and ASARCO had no duty as stockholders to manage 
the affairs of United Park or oversee the conduct of the 
directors. The Directors had the non-delecrable duty for 
overseeing the management of United Park. 
United Park cannot hold ARCO and ASARCO responsible for 
the conduct of board members just because ARCO and ASARCO caused 
the directors to be elected. Rather, United Park was required 
to come forward with facts showing that the directors performed 
their alleged wrongful actions at the behest of ARCO and ASARCO 
or that ARCO and ASARCO controlled the directors. Mere stock 
ownership or power to elect directors is not sufficient to 
demonstrate control over the independent business judgment of 
directors. Bergstein v. Texas International Co., 453 A.2d 467, 
473 (Del.Ch. 1982); Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 122-
123 (Del.Ch. 1971); Terrydale Liquidating Trust v. Barness, 611 
F.Supp. 1006, 1022 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 
805, 815-816 (Del.Supr. 1984); Atkins v. Tony Lama Co., Inc., 
624 F.Supp. 250, 256 (S.D. Ind. 1985). 
For example, in Aronson v. Lewis, supra, the appellate 
court reversed the trial court's refusal to dismiss a derivative 
suit on the basis that there had been an insufficient allegation 
of control and dominance by the alleged wrongdoer to excuse a 
demand upon the directors prior to filing the derivative suit. 
In so ruling, the court observed: 
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Plaintiff's claim that Fink dominates and 
controls the Meyers1 board is based on: (1) 
Fink's 47% ownership of Meyers1 outstanding 
stock, and (2) that he "personally selected" 
each Meyers director. . . . 
Such contentions do not support any claim 
under Delaware law that these directors lack 
independence, . . . There must be coupled with 
the allegation of control such facts as would 
demonstrate that through personal or other 
relationships the directors are beholden to the 
controlling person. . . . 
Thus, it is not enough to charge that a 
director was nominated by or elected at the 
behest of those controlling the outcome of a 
corporate election. That is the usual way a 
person becomes a corporate director. It is the 
care, attention and sense of individual 
responsibility to the performance of one's 
duties, not the method of election, that 
generally touches on independence. [473 A.2d at 
815-816] 
The cases relied upon by United Park for its contention 
that ARCO and ASARCO are liable for the alleged breach of the 
directors' duties involved facts far different from the case at 
bar. For example, in Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmount Mining Corp., 
535 A.2d 1334 (Dela. 1987), cited by United Park, a hostile 
tender offer was made for stock of the corporation. The 
corporation then declared a dividend so that its major 
stockholder, Gold Field, could increase its ownership of the 
stock from 26% to 49%. Gold Field did not control the 
corporation because its representation on the board was at first 
one-third and then increased to 40%. The court stated that 
under Delaware law a shareholder owes a fiduciary duty only if 
it owns a majority interest in or exercises control over the 
business affairs of the corporation and that Gold Field did not. 
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The court further noted that there was nothing which precluded 
Gold Field as a stockholder of the corporation from acting in 
its own self-interest. 
In Singer v. Maqnavox, 380 A.2d 969 (Dela. 1977), relied 
upon by United Park, the owner of 84% of the company's stock 
arranged a merger with another company the majority stockholder 
owned, the sole purpose of which was to freeze out minority 
stockholders. The court only considered the duty owed by a 
majority stockholder "in the context of a merger of two related 
Delaware corporations." 
Finally, in TWA v. Summa Corp., 374 A.2d 5 (Dela.Ch. 
1977) , Hughes Tool Co. and its sole stockholder, Howard Hughes, 
arranged for a purchase by Hughes Tool Co. rather than its 
wholly owned subsidiary, TWA, thus taking profits and benefits 
which would otherwise have gone to TWA. The court simply said 
that in these circumstances where the parent had controlled the 
transaction and fixed its terms, that the transaction had to be 
intrinsically fair to the subsidiary. 
United Park does not deny that ARCO and ASARCO spent 
millions of dollars on the mining prospects of United Park as 
stockholders and reaped not one penny in return. Further, 
United Park has not demonstrated any motive for ARCO or ASARCO 
to take any action contrary to the interest of their own stock 
ownership in United Park. United Park's incantation continues 
to be that ARCO and ASARCO, as the largest stockholders, 
sacrificed the interests of minority stockholders in United Park 
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to their "discrete mining interests."5 However, United Park does 
not enlighten the court even in the slightest as to what 
possible motivation ARCO and ASARCO could have had to cause 
damage to United Park stockholders, of which they were the 
largest, by causing United Park to take the actions which it did 
with respect to the resort in 1975. If United Park's claim is 
true, then ARCO and ASARCO conspired to shoot themselves in the 
head. 
Most importantly, United Park placed not one word, 
document or piece of evidence before the court below that ARCO 
and ASARCO did anything to require United Park's directors to 
take the actions they took with respect to the resort. The sole 
evidence was that ARCO and ASARCO nominated directors who 
allegedly were negligent or otherwise breached their fiduciary 
duty. And not one of those directors has been named as a 
defendant in this case. 
5
 If it is not clear from the name, it is certainly clear 
from the annual statements, that United Park City Mines is and was 
a mining company. The history of United Park City Mines is the 
consolidation of disparate mining interests in the Park City Mining 
District in order to build a mining company. When it announces 
itself to its shareholders and to the public in its SEC filings it 
identifies itself as a mining company. 
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D. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING UNITED PARK'S REQUEST 
FOR ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY. 
Included in Plaintiff United Park's 186 page Memorandum 
in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was a 
two paragraph argument that United Park should be given 
additional time for discovery before the Motions for Summary 
Judgment were decided, [R. 4644-45] The affidavit of David M. 
Watkiss, one of plaintiff's attorneys, filed in support of this 
request stated that United Park wanted to take additional 
depositions and obtain additional documents from ARCO and 
ASARCO. [R. 4865-67] Prior to the time that ARCO and ASARCO 
were joined as defendants the parties to the litigation had been 
involved in extensive discovery for over two years, which 
included the taking of numerous depositions and the examination 
of thousands of documents. United Park had already acquired in 
a voluntary production from ARCO all of its relevant documents. 
[Edwards Depo., at 24-6, R. 7919] Prior to being joined as a 
defendant, ASARCO had also voluntarily produced numerous 
relevant documents to the plaintiff, United Park. [Stipulation 
of Counsel Regarding Records of ASARCO, October 21, 1987. R. 
2606-10] 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying 
United Park's request for additional discovery because: (1) 
United Park's affidavit did not specify in what manner the 
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additional requested discovery was necessary or would meet the 
issues raised by defendants1 pending Motion for Summary Judgment 
as required by Rule 56(f); and (2) any further discovery would 
not have been relevant or at most would have been cumulative as 
to the issue of whether or not the shareholders or independent 
directors knew or were on inquiry notice of the alleged claims 
and breach of fiduciary duty and negligence by ARCO and ASARCO. 
1. United Park's General Request For Additional 
Discovery Did Not Meet the Requirements of Rule 
56(f). 
Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides: 
When Affidavits Are Unavailable. Should it appear 
from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion 
that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his 
opposition, the court may refuse the application 
for judgment or may order a continuance to permit 
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be 
taken or discovery to be had or may make such other 
order as is just. 
United Park in its Memorandum in Opposition to the 
Motions for Summary Judgment stated: 
[D]efendants' Summary Judgment Motions should be 
denied at this point in time because United Park 
has not been able to complete necessary discovery, 
[p. 104, R. 4644] 
Mr. Watkiss1 Affidavit stated: 
[T]he defendants1 motions should be denied at this 
time because United Park has not been able to 
complete all of the discovery that is necessary 
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before such motions could properly be heard. There 
are a number of present and former ARCO and ASARCO 
officials that must be deposed after appropriate 
document discovery has been obtained from these new 
defendants. [R. 4865] 
The affidavit then states that the deposition of six 
former ARCO and ASARCO employees and five or six additional 
persons should be taken. [R. 4865-67] The affidavit made no 
attempt to explain why United Park had made no effort to take 
any of these depositions during the period of over three months 
between the filing of the Summary Judgment Motions and the 
hearing thereon. 
Rule 56(f) requires a party to be specific as to why 
additional discovery is needed to respond to the issues raised 
by a motion for summary judgment and why the discovery which has 
been completed to date or the information available to him does 
not allow him to respond to the issues raised by the motion. 
The issues raised by ARCO's and ASARCO's Motion for 
Summary Judgment related to the presence in United Park at all 
times of independent directors and stockholders, lack of 
majority control of the board of United Park by ARCO and ASARCO 
long before the statute of limitations ran, and whether or not 
the shareholders or independent directors had inquiry notice of 
the alleged breach of fiduciary duty and negligence of ARCO and 
ASARCO relative to the 197 5 transactions and agreements. United 
Parkfs affidavit fails to specify how any additional discovery 
would be relevant to or reach these issues. United Park's 
affidavit was only a general conclusory affidavit that it should 
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have been allowed to conduct additional discovery before the 
motions for summary judgment were decided. 
In Callioux v. Progressive Insurance Co., 745 P.2d 838 
(Utah App. 1987), the Utah appellate court affirmed the trial 
court's refusal to grant plaintiff's request for additional 
discovery prior to ruling on defendant's motion for summary 
judgment: 
Furthermore, even if a party does file an affidavit 
or the court is willing to consider other material 
in place of an affidavit, the opposing party must 
nevertheless explain how the continuance will aid 
his opposition to the summary judgment. [Citations 
omitted] 
In explanation, 'the party opposing the motion must 
present facts in proper form . . . . And the 
opposing party's facts must be material and of a 
substantial nature.' 6 J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. 
Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice par. 56.15[3] (2d 
Ed. 1987) . 
* * * 
The Callioux' motion for continuance made a 
conclusory claim of need for further discovery but 
was not accompanied by the required Rule 56(f) 
affidavit setting forth the reasons why they could 
not present 'facts essential to justify their 
opposition . . . .' Even if the Callioux' motion 
was to be accepted as a Rule 56(f) affidavit, their 
motion fails to articulate any material area of 
inquiry they intended to pursue by deposition with 
the claims adjuster and arson specialist. The 
Callioux' conclusory assertion that the scheduled 
depositions were 'expected to produce matter 
essential to resolution of defendant's motion1 
smacks of a 'fishing expedition' for purely 
speculative facts. 
Id. at 841. 
In Taylor v. Galligher, 737 F.2d 134 (1st Cir. 1984), 
the court stated: 
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A court may grant summary judgment despite an 
opposing partyfs claim that discovery would yield 
additional facts that could be developed through 
such discovery. See, e.g., Santoni v. Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corp. , 677 F.2d 174, 179 (1st 
Cir. 1982) ; Neely v. St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Insurance Co., 584 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1978). 
Taylor did not show, through a Rule 56(f) affidavit 
or otherwise, how discovery could have breathed 
life into his claim. 
Id. at 137. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
United Park's conclusory request that "the defendants1 motions 
should be denied at this time because United Park has not been 
able to complete all of the discovery necessary before such 
motions could properly be heard." [R. 4865] 
2. As To The Issues Raised By ARCO and ASARCO's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Additional Discovery Requested 
By United Park Would Be Irrelevant Or At Most 
Cumulative. 
ARCO and ASARCO's Motion for Summary Judgment raised the 
issue as to whether or not the stockholders or independent 
directors of United Park knew or were on inquiry notice in 1975 
of the alleged claims of breach of fiduciary duty or negligence 
by ARCO and ASARCO. The stockholders and independent directors 
had access to the 1975 agreements, the agreements and their 
effect were set forth in detail in the proxy statement sent to 
the United Park stockholders and was discussed, reviewed and 
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voted upon at a special shareholders1 meeting held on October 7, 
1975, The opposition of Jerome Gartner, an attorney for a 
minority shareholder to the proposed agreement, was discussed at 
this shareholder meeting. [R. 5939-46] 
Any additional discovery taken by United Park might have 
shown that the United Park stockholders and independent 
directors knew more about the 1975 restructuring agreements, but 
it certainly would not show that they knew less. 
In Volk v. D.A. Davidson and Co. , 816 F.2d 1406 (9th 
Cir. 1987), the court affirmed the granting of defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and also held that the trial court 
had not abused its discretion in refusing plaintiff's request to 
conduct additional discovery. The court stated: 
The burden is on the party seeking to conduct 
additional discovery to put forth sufficient facts 
to show that the evidence sought exists. VISA 
International Service Assoc, v. Bankcard Holders of 
America, 784 F.2d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(courts deny Rule 56(f) applications where it is 
clear that the evidence sought is almost certainly 
non-existent or is the object of pure speculation). 
The evidence submitted overwhelmingly 
indicated that appellants had notice of the fraud 
on the date they received the 1978 annual report. 
Additional discovery could not reveal facts 
indicating appellants had less knowledge than they 
admittedly had. 
Id. at 1416. 
In Powers v. McGuigan, 769 F.2d 72 (2nd Cir. 1985), the 
court stated: 
[A] party may properly seek a continuance under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) in order to seek discovery 
for the purpose of opposing a motion for summary 
judgment; however, where the discovery sought would 
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not meet the issue the moving party contends 
contains no genuine issue of fact, it is not an 
abuse of discretion to decide the motion for 
summary judgment without granting discovery. 
Id. at 76. 
In Froid v. Berner. 649 F.Supp 1418 (D.N.J. 1986), the 
court stated: 
Plaintiff's affidavit fails to convince the Court 
that defendants1 motion should be denied so that 
discovery could be had. First, the discovery 
sought must be relevant to the plaintiff's ability 
to rebut the specific issue upon which summary 
judgment is sought. 
Id. at 1425. 
United Park's general and conclusory request for 
additional discovery did not meet the requirements of Rule 
56(f). Also, any additional discovery would not have met the 
issues raised by ARCO and ASARCO's Motions for Summary Judgment. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to 
grant plaintiff's request for additional discovery prior to 
deciding ARCO and ASARCO's Motions for Summary Judgment. 
VIII. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully 
submitted that the effort of Loeb and Bamberger to use their 
newly acquired control position of United Park to attempt to 
attack transactions occurring over fifteen years ago should be 
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rejected. The district court's decision dismissing United 
Park's claims should be affirmed. 
DATED this / Sttl day of February, 1991. 
BURBIDGE St MITCHELL 
STEPHEN B. MITCHELL1 
Attorneys for Appellee ARCO 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
MERLIN O. BAKER, 
Attorneys for Appellee ASARCO 
js arco.app\brief 
70 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I mailed four 
(4) copies of the Brief of Appellees Atlantic Richfield Company 
and ASARCO, Inc. to the following parties by depositing the same 
in U.S. mails, postage prepaid, this \ fip^day of February, 1991: 
Merlin 0. Baker, Esq. 
Jonathan A. Dibble, Esq. 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
79 South Main, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Philip C. Potter, Jr. 
Donald N. Dirks, Esq. 
Davis, Polk & Wardwell 
One Chase Manhattan Plaza 
New York, New York 10015 
David K. Watkiss 
David B. Watkiss 
Watkiss & Campbell 
310 South Main, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
James A. Boevers, Esq. 
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler 
City Centre I, Suite 400 
17 5 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Gordon Strachan, Esq. 
Strachan & Strachan 
614 Main Street, Suite 401 
P.O. Box 4485 
Park City, Utah 84060-4485 
Richard W. Giauque, Esq. 
Wendy A. Faber, Esq. 
Giauque, Williams, Wilcox & Bendinger 
500 Kearns Building 
136 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Randy L. Dryer, Esq. 
Elisabeth R. Blattner, Esq. 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
185 South State, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
71 
Michael F. Jones, Esq. 
Pruitt, Gushe & Bachtell 
136 South State, Suite 1850 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Howard L. Edwards, Esq. 
515 South Flower Street 
Los Angeles, California 90071 
72 
APPENDIX A 
P R O X Y S T A T E M E N T 
UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY 
309 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
SPECIAL MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS 
October 7, 1975 
This Proxy S>atemenc, which was mailed to shareholders on approximately September 8, 1975, 
is furnished in connection with the solicitation of proxies by the management of United Park City 
Mines Company, a Delaware corporation (the "Company"), for use at the Special Meeting of 
Stockholders of the Company to be held at 10:30 am (Mountain Daylight Time) on October 7, 
1975, at the office of the Company, 309 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, and at any adjourn-
ment thereof. 
On August 22, 1975, the record date for determination of stockholders entitled to notice of 
and to vote at the meeting, the Company had outstanding 5,400,755 shares of capital stock, $1.00 
par value. Each such share is entitled to one vote on every matter submitted to the meeting. 
On the record date, The Anaconda Company, a Montana corporation ("Anaconda"), was 
the record and beneficial owner of 993,537 shares of capital stock of the Company, representing 
18.4% of the total shares outstanding, and Asarco, Inc , a New Jersey corporation ("Asarco") was 
the record and beneficial owner of 688,012 shares of capital stock of the Company, representing 
12.7%) of the total shares outstanding. Management of the Company knows of no other stock-
holder, who holds in the aggregate, of record or beneficially, 10% or more of the outstanding capital 
stock of the Company. 
ANY PERSON GIVING A PROXY HAS THE RIGHT TO REVOKE IT AT ANY 
TIME BEFORE IT IS EXERCISED. 
APPROVAL OF RESTRUCTURING OF INTERESTS IN 
GREATER PARK CITY COMPANY 
Introductory Statement 
As a result of the inability of Greater Park City Company, a Utah corporation ("GPCC"), 
to meet its existing contractual obligations, and to otherwise obtain financing adequate to carry 
on its business and activities, as of June 23, 197 5, the principal creditors and the stockholders of 
GPCC entered into a Memorandum of Agreement ("Agreement") setting forth in general terms 
the essential provisions of and the essential steps to t^ e taken pursuant to a plan tor the adjustment of 
the assets and liabilities of GPCC The parties tu .ne Agreement are GPCC, Umonamenca, Inc. 
("UA"), Royal Street Corporation ("RSC"), Morgan Guaranty Trust Company ot New York, as 
AOOl-S'C 
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Trustee ("Morgan") , The Fidelity Bank, as Trustee ("Fidelity"), Alpine Meadows of Tahoe, Inc. 
("Alpine") , and the Company. 
As stated in the Agreement, the ultimate purposes of the intended transactions are to relieve 
GPCC of real estate inventory, real estate held for development, and essentially all of its real estate 
mortgage debt and to infuse into GPCC adequate equity capital to place it on a solid financial 
footing whereby its operations may be successfully and profitably conducted. In order to achieve 
these objectives, certain parties to the Agreement have agreed to changes or modifications in or dis-
position of their ownership interest in, or contract or credit arrangements with, GPCC and certain 
other of the related parties, and Alpine has agreed to contribute funds to G P C C 'i he Company has 
agreed to disposition of its stock ownership interest m and modifications of its contractual agree-
ments with GPCC, subject to the requirement that they be approved by the stockholders of the 
Company. 
(t is the opinion of management of the Company that if the restructuring of GPCC in sub-
stantially the form established by the Agreement is not effected, GPCC will not be able to meet 
its obligations to the Company or its other major creditors and will not be able to continue in opera-
tion. As a result, the Company would be required to enforce its rights under the respective agree-
ments with GPCC, as described below, which would likely result in the recovery by the Company of 
the property interests covered or secured by such agreements. It would then be necessary for the 
Company to take whatever actions may be appropriate for the operation of the ski properties and de-
velopment and sale of the real property. Management believes that such action may result in pro-
tracted and complex legal proceedings and would be detrimental to the interests of the Company if 
this were to occur, and the Board of Directors of the Company has determined that the modifications 
described below with respect to the contractual and ownership interests and rights in GPCC axe in 
the best interests of the Company and its stockholders and recommends that the stockholders vote 
in favor of such modifications. In this respect, Anaconda and Asarco have indicated their approval 
of the provisions of the Agreement and have indicated that they intend to vote the shares of capital 
stock in the Company which they hold in favor of the disposition and modifications. The Agreement 
provides that the disposition and modifications must be approved by the holders of £ majority of 
outstanding shares of capital stock of the Company represented 2c a meeting of stockholders to be 
held prior to October 31, 1975. In order for business to be conducted at the meeting, at least a 
majority of the outstanding shares of capital stock (a quorum) must be represented at the meeting. 
Present Rights and Interests of the Company in GPCC 
At the present time, the ownership interest in and the concract rights of the Company with 
GPCC are as follows: 
1. The Company owns 900,000 shares (63.2%) of the preferred stock and 900,000 shares 
(39.4%) of the common stock of GPCC which it acquired at an aggregate cost of $972,000. 
2. The Company and GPCC are parties to a Purchase Agreement dated as of January 1, 1971, 
as amended ("Purchase Agreement"), pursuant to which GPCC initially had the right to purchase 
from the Company approximately 4,200 acres of real property Together with various facilities and 
improvements and personal property located at Park City, Utah. The total price payable under the 
Purchase Agreement was the sum of $5,574,627, the sum of 55.949,429 of which is still payable. 
Approximately 2,014 acres of real property are still subject to the Purchase Agreement. The Pur-
2 
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chase Agreement provides that in the event of default by GPCC thereunder or under the Water 
Rights Purchabe Agreement or the principal Ski Slope Lease described below, the Company will 
have several alternative rights, including the right to be released from the obligation to convey any 
properties which have not previously been conveyed and to retain all payments theretofore made 
by GPCC or to treat the Purchase Agreement as a note and mortgage and proceed to foreclose the 
same GPCC is currently in default in making payments under the Purchase Agreement, and 
accordingly, aside from the provisions of the Agreement, the Company presently has the right to 
pursue these remedies 
3 The Company and GPCC are parties to a Water Rights Purchase Agreement dated as of 
January I, 1971 covering the purchase by GPCC of certain water rights owned by the Company 
The purchase price for the water rights was the principal sum of $500,000, none of which has 
been paid The purchase price is payable it the time the last payment is made under the Purchase 
Agreement Accrued interest on the purchase pr<ce it the rate of 6^7 per annum is payable monthly 
GPCC is presently in default in the payment of accrued interest under the Water Rights Purchase 
Agreement which at July 31, 1975 amounted to $25 000 
4 GPCC is entitled upon certain performance under the Purchase Agreement to a lease 
covering 47 acres «n the Deer Vallev area and a lease covering approximately 700 acres in the 
Crescent Ridge area, and the Company and GPCC are parties to a lease dated as of January I, 1971 
pursuant to which the Company leases to GPCC for the construction, development and operation of 
ski lifts, ski runs and other winter and summer recreational and resort facilities, approximately 
5,363 acres of real property located in the Park City area The leases and lease rights are referred 
to herein as the Ski Slope Leases The primary term of the Ski Slope Leases is 20 years and GPCC 
presently has the option to extend that term for an additional 20 years The rental payable under the 
Ski Slope Leases is an amount equal to 1% of the first $100,000 of lift revenue received during 
each calendar year and 0 5% of lift revenue in excess of $100,000 received during said calendar 
year, with a minimum rental of $ 50 per acre per year During 1973 and 1974, respectively, the 
Company received $9,425 and $14,417 as rental under the Ski Slope Leases GPCC is not in default 
in making the required payments under these leases 
5 On July 30, 1974, the Company and other stockholders loaned to GPCC the sum of 
$2,000,000 The Company, as its participation in this transaction, loaned to GPCC the sum of 
$787,040 This loan is secured by a mortgage on certain property of GPCC at Park City Principal 
on the loan was payable on April 30, 1975 The loan bears interest at a rate equal to the prime rate 
of The Chase Manhattan Bank, N A GPCC is presently in default in paying the principal amount 
and accrued interest on this loan At July 31, 1975 the accrued interest payable to the Company 
amounted to $76,722 
Proposed Modifications in the Interests of the Company 
Pursuant to the Agreement, it is proposed that the following steps will be taken with respect 
to the interests of the Company 
1 The preferred stock of GPCC held by the Company will be sold to GPCC for $1,000 
The common stock of GPCC held by the Company will be sold co Alpine for $1,000 
Aooursi 
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2. Accrued and unpaid interest under the Purchase Agreement to April 30, 1975, in the amount 
of $169,030, will be cancelled. There will be no principal payments due and payable under the 
Purchase Agreement for the years 1975, 1976 and 1977. A principal payment of $217,179 will 
be payable on January 1, 1978, and a principal payment of $350,000 will be payable on the first 
day of each year thereafter until January 1, 1989, at which time a final principal payment in the 
amount of $232,500 will be payable. Interest on the Purchase Agreement from May 1, 1975, to the 
first day of the month in which the closing of the restructuring of GPCC is effected, at the rate of 
l°/o per annum, will be paid on such closing date, and thereafter it will be payable monthly. 
3. Accrued and unpaid interest under the Water Rights Purchase Agreement to April 30, 
1975 in the amount of $17,500 will be cancelled. Interest under the Water Rights Purchase Agree-
ment from May 1, 1975 to the first day of the month in which the closing of the restructuring of 
GPCC is effected, will be paid on such closing date, and thereafter it will be paid monthly. 
4. Accrued and unpaid interest payable to the Company under the stockholders loan to April 
30, 1975 :n the amount of $62,122 will be cancelled. In addition, the present security for such loan 
will be released and the unpaid principal balance will be covered by a note in che principal amount 
of $787,040, payable in installments of $350,000 on January 1, 1990, and $437,040 on January 1, 
1991, with interest thereon at the rate of 1% per annum from May 1, 1975. The note will be 
secured by a mortgage of the interest now held or hereafter acquired by GPCC in certain real 
property which is presently being purchased by GPCC pursuant to the Purchase Agreement. Interest 
accruing on the note from May 1, 1975 to the first day of the month in which the closing of the 
restructuring is effected, will be paid on the date of closing. Thereafter, interest will be payable 
monthly. Management of the Company does not believe that the transactions described in Para-
graphs 1 and 5 under the caption "Actions to be Taken by the Other Parties co the Agreement" 
will have any material effect on the stockholders loan. 
5. The Ski Slope Leases will be amended to provide options for two additional extensions of 
20 years each. If such options are exercised, ski rental during the first such additional extension will 
be 2°/Q of the first $100,000 of annual ski lift ticket revenues and 1% of the excess, and rental 
during the second such additional extension will be 3 % of the first $100,000 and lYi% of the 
excess. In addition, the Company will agree that until May 1, 1980, it will not exercise its rights 
under the Ski Slope Leases pursuant to which the Company has the right to sell certain property 
covered thereby after granting to the lessee the right of first refusal to purchase such property. 
6. In order to accomplish the transactions contemplated by the Agreement, it is intended that 
certain rights of GPCC under the Purchase Agreement, Water Rights Purchase Agreement and the 
Ski Slope Leases will be assigned or otherwise transferred to certain other entities which are parties 
to the Agreement or are affiliates of such parties. It is intended that in connection with such transfers 
or assignment, the Company will consent thereto only upon the condition that GPCC will not be 
released or relieved of or from any obligations under such agreements, that all cross-default pro-
visions under such agreements shall remain in force and effect, and that an escrow and trust agree-
ment will be entered into between the interested parties and First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. or 
such other bank as may be agreed upon, whereby all monies arising from ski operations, land sales, 
or other activities alTecting such properties or agreement, which any of said parties is obligated to 
pay to give GPCC funds for the performance of the terms and provisions of the agreements with 
the Company, shall be paid to such Trustee and disbursed by it to the Company upon the indebted-
ness owing to the Company under such agreements. 
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Actions to be Taken by the Other Parties to the Agreement 
Under the Agreement, numerous changes are required with respect to the interests of the 
other parties to the Agreement, including but not limited to the following: 
1. On June 12, 1975, a nominee of UA acquired from GPCC and Treasure Mountain Cor-
poration, a wholly-owned subsidiary of GPCC, certain real property, trust deed notes, contracts and 
personal property in exchange for the cancellation of debt and accrued interest owing by GPCC 
and Treasure Mountain Corporation to UA in the amount of $9,223,655. UA held mortgages, trust 
deeds or other liens or encumbrances on the real property so acquired. In addition, in consideration 
for the assignments described in Paragraph 6 below, UA will cancel amounts owed to it pursuant to 
certain subordinated notes and stockholder loans which, at April 30, 1975, were in the aggregate 
amount of $382,547. 
2. RSC will sell all of its claims as a creditor of GPCC, in the aggregate amount of approxi-
mately $3,489,780, together with all of its preferred stock and common stock in GPCC, to Alpine 
for the sum of $4,000. In addition, a wholly-owned subsidiary of RSC will have the rights referred 
to in Paragraph 5 below. 
3. Morgan and Fidelity will cancel subordinated notes, stockholder notes and accrued interest 
owed to them by GPCC, which at April 30, 1975 were in the aggregate amount of $6,240,513, and 
will contribute to GPCC all of their stock in GPCC. Subsidiaries of Morgan and Fidelity will have 
the rights referred to in Paragraph 6 below. 
4. Alpine will cancel all of the debt of GPCC transferred to it by RSC and, in addition, will 
contribute to GPCC the sum of $1,300,000. 
5. A subsidiary of RSC will acquire from GPCC a one-half interest in the water rights covered 
by the Water Rights Purchase Agreement, a substantial portion of the developable real estate owned 
by GPCC, including a substantial portion of that which is being acquired by GPCC under the Pur-
chase Agreement (subject to the rights of the Company) and under a Real Estate Contract with 
Herbert S. and William M. Armstrong, for which that subsidiary will assume payment obligations 
of GPCC in the amount of $2,236,858 under the Water Rights Purchase Agreement, the Purchase 
Agreement and said Real Estate Contract. The price payable by GPCC for these property interests 
was approximately $2,107,468. The Company does not know the current market value of these 
property interests. 
6. GPCC will assign its rights in the Ski Slope Leases and its rights under the Purchase Agree-
ment to purchase certain property on which the ski lifts and ski runs are situated to two newly-
formed corporations to be owned by Morgan, Fidelity and UA, which in turn will sublease such 
interests to GPCC. The interests will remain subject to the rights of the Company under the Ski 
Slope Leases and the Purchase Agreement. GPCC will remain liable to the Company for the re-
quired payments under the Ski Slope Leases and the Purchase Agreement. However, certain 
revenues from the operation of the properties will be placed in escrow and will be available, to the 
extent required, to make the payments thereunder. 
As a result of the transactions proposed by the Agreement, when the restructuring of GPCC 
is effected, it is intended that GPCC will be principally engaged in the business of operating the ski 
lifts, golf course and related facilities at the Park City Resort and will not be engaged in any residen-
5 
tial or commercial real property development activities, and Alpine will own 80% of the outstand-
ing common stock of GPCC and the remaining 20% will be owned by UA In addition, the liabilities 
ot GPCC v^ »11 not be in excess of its assets 
Effect on the Company's Financial Condition 
Management of cne Company does not believe that the disposition of the stock of GPCC and 
the modifications of the agreements with GPCC will have a significant effect on the Company s 
assets and business Because of the method in which the Company has accounted for its stock 
interest in GPCC in past years, all of the Company s investment in the stock was written off for 
accounting purposes during 1974 and prior years Thus, the disposition of the stock at this 
time for a nominal consideration will not have a material effect on the Company s income and 
assets as reflected on its financial statements as at December 31, 1974 
The Company has not accrued interest on the obligations payable by GPCC since September 30, 
1974 Accordingly, the foregiveness at this time of interest on such obligations through April 30, 
1975 will not require any further adjustments in the Company's financial statements, or affect net 
income or net tangible book value as at December 31, 1974 It is the position of the Company, 
however, that subject to the Agreement, such interest is owing to the Company and, accordingly, 
the references to accrued interest in this Proxy Statement includes interest during that period of time 
COST A N D M E T H O D O F P R O X Y SOLICITATION 
The cost of soliciting proxies will be borne by the Company In addition to solicitations by 
mail, arrangements have been made with brokerage houses, nominees and other custodians and 
fiduciaries to send the proxy material to their principals, and the Company will reimburse them for 
their expenses in doing so Proxies may also be solicited personalis or by telephone or by telegraph 
by the directors and officers of the Company without additional compensation 
O T H E R BUSINESS 
The management ib not awa re of any other business which will come before the meeting If 
day other business should come before the meeting, the persons named in the proxies solicited by 
management will vote on it according to their best judgment 
By Order of the Board of Directors 
E L OsiKA, Secretary 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
September 2, 1975 
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APPENDIX B 
JEROME C A R T N e f l 
^ 
A **» ATTO^MKV AT LJkW 
»IO JL4AXMSON A V I N U t 
rfKW Y O W , N I W YOAK IOOIT 
October 3f 1975 
C ) ^ ^ -v <*^)u. ^*».u^;^ <^^\ " ^ < y Mr, S- N. Cornwall 
3322 Oakland 
Sa l t Lake C i t y , Utah 64101 
Deer Mr. Cornwall % 
I em w r i t i n g t o you on b e h a l f o f Timothy Oonath who baa been 
a shareho lder , f o r a long t ime, o f "the United Park City Corporation 
( h e r e i n a f t e r referred to by i t s New York Stock Exchange symbol, UPK), 
X r e s p e c t f u l l y demand t h a t y o u , i n d i v i d u a l l y and c o l l e c t i v e l y 
mm d i r e c t o r s of UPK adjourn the s c h e d u l e d meeting of October 7 , 1975 
tint 11 you i a e u e a r«viin< pru&y " "I a ' mmmn ? l e u i n g forth the f a i r n e s s 
of the c o n s i d e r s t l o a t o be reoeivec! by the IW stockholders and 
consider* r e v i e w end modify your proposed f i n a l s a l e of t h e v a l u a b l e 
e k i r e s o r t . Bark C i t y , «• ami f o r t h i a f u l l e r d e t a i l below. Jhid 
f u r t h e r , t h a t you take immediate s t e p e t o withdraw your a i g n a t u r e and 
approval from the propoaed r e o r g a n i s a t l o Q of GPCC (Greater r\ark C i t y 
Corporiit i r e t **bieh present ly cxmtro le the nil area) and r e l a t e d 
c o r p o r a t i o n s , tmti.1 care fu l rev iew o f t b e proposed abandonment: off t h e 
i n v a l u a b l e r i g h t s of the aki area now posses sed *by UHC. These r i g h t s 
may be i r r e p a r a b l y lout by p a s s i n g i n t o t h e handa of bona f i d e purchaser* 
(Continued) 
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f o r v e l u e , who vr i l l c u l o f f the c l a i m * now enforceable a g a i n s t t h e 
o t h e r p a r t i e s t o tha proposed t r a n s a c t i o n . 
The h u r r i e d p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h i s demand a t t h i a l a t a d a t e 
s t ems d i r e c t l y f r c a t h e m i s l e a d i n g and c o n f u s i n g i m p r e s s i o n o f t h e 
f a c t s o b t a i n e d from r e a d i n g your puraccy artatamant f o r t h a O c t o b e r 7 9 1975 
m e e t i n g o f s h a r e h o l d e r s . Only i n t e n s i v e r e a e a r c h and r e v i e w o f t h e 
i n c o m p l e t e s e t o f documents a v a l l a b i a £ o x I n s p e c t i o n a t t h e New York 
S t o c k Exchange and S e c u r i t i e s and Ebccbsnge r e c o r d room a t F e d e r a l 
P l a z a t New York made possible the facta and analysis outlined below, 
to aid you to make the correct determination, before i t la too lata , 
to preserve the rights of the UFK stockholders to the valuable -property 
being abandoned in the proposed agreement act forth in your October 7 
proxy statement* Particularly* 1 cm 11 your attention that the riqhts 
and Interests of the minority etockfeolders may well vary from those 
of controlling . stockholders and other conflicting intareata Involved 
in the proposed agreement; and that your duty as directors 1m t o mil 
tha shareholder*. 
The great loos about to be swTfered by the aha reh old ere of UFK 
can beat be understood by a brief description of the background of the 
companyf t h i a h i s t o r y o f t h e mid w a i t mud t h e o r i g i n a l a g r e e m e n t 
a p p r o v e d by t h e s t o c k h o l d e r s i n 1 9 7 0 * 
BACKGROUND OP COMPANY (UPK) 
UPK owns an o l d and famous m i l v m r m i n e , s t a r t e d i n t h e 1 6 7 0 ' s , 4 
l o c a t e d a b o u t t h i r t y m i l e s o u t s i d e S a l t Xeke C i t y * U t a h , and x m p u t e d l y 
t h e o r i g i n a l b a s i s o f t h e greert l l e a i s t f o r t u n e . The m i n i n g m r e e 
300131 
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originally contained hundreds of individual claims, many of which vara 
later co&aolideted into UPK. After the pxoeperity during Vorld War II, 
the alne'a pxoeperity depended on the fluctuating pricaa of s i l v e r , 
sine and lead, although ita ore ie vary rich, with conaiatently oloee 
to 25% yield in sine and lead, mm well aa varying smounts of s i lver , 
k/ith an -apparently quasi-independent Board of Direct ore, the mine vaa 
regularly worked in the 1950*a and I960*a and, aided by a government 
grant, some exploration of reaouroea was done* 
In the early 196^'a, the direct ore decided to exploit the 
potential of the land above the mine for a aki resort and the greatly 
increased value of land adjoining a ski lesoi't for ski houses* VIth 
the aid of a million dollar loan from tha Smell Business Administrationv 
the Park City ski resort was started, ski l i f t s built, and land sales 
coamenced on the 10,000 odd sores of the mounts in owned by UFK-
Litigation wee successfully pursued to substantiate the UPK 
rights to water, upon information and belief subsequent to tbe sale 
agreement of the conteated rights t o the UA group (defined below)-
Vater rights are invaluable in this arid area of the west. 
1970 DECISIONS 
About 1970, two major decisions ware madet f irs t , t o lease 
the mine to the two controlling shareholders, Anaconda and American 
Smelting and Refining Company, who ware to build a 750 ton/day 
concentrator and actively exploit tha mine* (The concentrator vent 
Into use in April of 1975 and, according t o the Anaconda V* Q lepoxt 
of spring, 1975, should produce over 60,(W> tons of lead and sine 
(Continued) 
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c o n c e n t r a t e , and 1 . 2 M i l l i o n o u n c e s o f a i l v a r e a c h - y e a r from A p r i l , . 
1975*, o n w a r d . UPK v i l l be e n t i t l e d t o o n e - t h i r d o f t h a p r o f i t 
a f t e r t h a m i n i n g companies r e c o v e r tha c o a t a of t h e i r i n v e s t m e n t . 
Tbe m i n e i a o p e r a t e d c o m p l e t e l y b y t h a m i n i n g companies and UPK h a s 
a p a s s i v e e q u i v a l e n t of a r o y a l t y p o a i t i o n w i t h a a m a l l g u a r a n t e e d 
a n n u a l payment from tha min ing componiea* j o i n t v e n t u r e . 
S e c o n d l y , a t t n e same t i m e , a d e a l was e n t e r e d i n t o w i t h 
Union A m e r i c a n , and s o * * a f f i l i a t e a o f Union American ( h e r e i n a f t e r 
r e f e r r e d t o ea UA) f o r tha i n t e n s i v e deve lopment o f t h e a k i r e s o r t o f 
Perk C i t y , f o r t h e porpoee o f b u i l d i n g i t i n t o one o f t h a m a j o r a k i 
a r e a s o f t h e w o r l d . 
Tbua i n 1970 9 t h e two m a j o r a s s e t s o f UPK were a o l d and l e a s e d 
and t h e a g r e e m e n t a t h e r e o f s u b m i t t e d f o r s t o c k h o l d e r a p p r o v a l , w h i c h 
was o b t a i n e d . The Board o f D i r e c t o r s waa and has c o n t i n u e d t o b e 
c o o s t i t r a t e d o f p a i d employees o f Anaconda and American S m e l t i n g , p l u s 
s e v e r a l n on - e m p l o y e a diree*<*ra. I t would a p p e e r t h a t a f f e c t i v e c o n t r o l 
o f t h e Board of D i r e c t o r s and p o l i c i e s r e s t w i t h t h e t w o c o n t r o l l i n g 
a b a r e b o l d e r e t h r o u g h t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s on t h e o o a r o « i ^ r n c i . o r a « 
BACKGROUND CP THE SKI RESORT ARRANCEKSNTS 
The 1 9 7 0 s k i r e s o r t a g r e e m e n t waa be tween UPK and a g r o u p o f 
c o m p a n i e s c o n t r o l l e d by UA ( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o ma UA Group)* 
The UA Group I n c l u d e s tha G r e a t e r Park C i t y C o r p o r a t i o n (GPCC), 
T r e a a u r e Mounta in C o r p o r a t i o n , R o y a l S t r e e t C o r p o r a t i o n , W e s t e r n 
m o r t g a g e , And o t h e r companies v h o a e names a r e p r e s e n t l y unknown. 
I n o e p e u l e , UFK waa t o h a v e a d o u b l e p o s i t i o n I n t h e n e w 
a r r a n g e m e n t * f i r s t , t h e r i g h t Zo a p p r o x i m a t e l y h a l f o f t h e m t t u i t y 
mtock i n 'the new a k i r e s o r t demmtlopment, mnd t s e c o n d l y , t h e p r o t e c t i o n 
( C o n t i n u e d ) 
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of a f irst purchase aonev mortgage, vhoae terms provided that UPK 
could recover all the property and improvements, if there vet any 
default in paying the five million dollar purchaee price (payable 
over a period of years). The UA Group was to provide an in i t ia l 
four and one-half million H«TI*«. -^.^ty capital as veil aa to arrange 
additional financing and operate the ski resort and building venture. 
The agreement as presented to the stockholders in 1970 
spelled out mmny of the precautions in the original agreement 
between the UA Group and UPK, to safeguard the UPK interest in the 
ski resort. Among them weret 
(1) The 4200 acres to be sold to the UA Group' were divided into 
fourteen parcels with t i t le to be released over s period of time as 
payments -were received end building commenced on a particular parcel. 
(2) The sale of water rights mas, in effect, not final until the final 
payment via mode for the. purcbaae price. 
£3) The 6100 acres containing the ski l i f t s snd recreational areas 
were only leased to the UA Group. 
(4) The UA Group had to invest not less than 4.5 million dollars in 
capital begore the agreement would become effective. 
(5) The UA Group bad to spend not less than $150,000.00 in feasibi l i ty 
studies, preliminary lend use analyses, market studies and revenue 
projections* 
(6) Other- protective clausea included maintenance of property mnd a 
-aerietry odf vjya for UPK to enforce i t s rights if payments vera not made. 
(Continued) 
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( 7 ) Representation by UPK wee provided on the boerd oR boerde of 
*>crveral of the UA Group• 
( 8 ) UPK received the r i g h t s t o ecoulre approximately h a l f of the e o u i t y 
In the eki resort ooctpeny a t a nomine 1 vum, which r i g h t s were most ly 
exerc i s ed by UPK. 
At the time t b i e agreement wae made, UPK was running a 
s u b s t a n t i a l funct ioning s k i r e e o r t with operating revenues of 
approximately one m i l l i o n d o l l a r s a year.. Land s a l e s , however, vara 
minimal. UA wes handed
 t f o r a down payment of one m i l l i o n d o l l a r s , 
r i g h t s over 10,000 acres of va luab le land, a going a k i r e s o r t , and 
va luab le water r i g h t s , i n re turn for t h e i r promise t o supply e q u i t y 
c a p i t a l , expert i se and borrowing abi l i ty , . 
This agreement could be characterised as f o l l o w s % UPK 
purchased » partner t o tkvBloo the sk i resort* which partner claimed 
t o have the money1 and the f i n a n c i a l and rea l e s t a t e e x p e r t i s e t o 
p r o f i t a b l y develop the p o t e n t i a l of sk i houses around a major s k i 
r e s o r t , UPK geve tbeAUA Group over half of the p r o f i t s and i n t e r e s t 
i n return for e small down payment and numerous promises t o put i n 
the necessary funds, borrow more funde and provide t h e r e a l e s t a t e 
knownov. 
The or ig ina l agreement took many precautions t o p r o t e c t the 
UPK p o s i t i o n should the UA Group not be able t o s u c c e s s f u l l y d e l i v e r 
a* promised. These p r e c a u t i o n s , whose d e t a i l s are s p e l l e d out In t h e 
1970 agreement, can be summed up as fo l lows t UPK yould recover a l l 
(Continued) 
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the property and ioprovereenta If the UA Group vag not cuccetoful. 
It i s clear fro* the number and details of. the precaution* that the 
poaeibility of failure on the part of the UA Group vsa both contemplated 
and provided for in the original agreement. 
As of Octobert 1975, I t ia clear that the ski raaort project 
ia not presently an economic aucoess, and the UA Group has failed 
in oarryin^out i t s part of the original bargain. 
The question 1c why UPK should abandon most of i t s property 
right6 because of the UA Group*a failure9 and why UPK should not recover 
al l the property baaed on the origina 1 preoautlons provided for in the 
1970 aprectpent approved by the stockholders. 
Payment of three n i l lion dollars, erterting three years from 
now, for the sVti resort values the improvements at t tro and the 
acreage at $300 per acre and the \*ater rights at rero-
A rough and probably low estivation of $l^ tOOO for a building 
site values all of UEK*a interest at approximately 3m building s i t e s . 
^wmtinuco/ 
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PROPOSAL OF PROKY STATEMENT FOR OCTOBER 7 , 1975 MEETING 
Upon information and b e l i e f , the present proposed proxy statemen 
for the October 7 meeting i s m a t e r i a l l y mis leading, f a i l s t o s e t for th 
the fa i rness of the cons iderat ion t o be received by UPK for the property 
being disposed of, and i s i n v i o l a t i o n of the SEC rules and r e g u l a t i o n s , 
par t i cu lar ly 1^B5 and Sec t ion 14, p a r t i c u l a r l y those s p e c i f y i n g the 
fa irness of the cons iderat ion for property d i s p o s i t i o n and providing 
of f inanc ia l records for previous years . Further, the present 
proposal v i o l a t e s the d i r e c t o r s 1 d u t i e s to the shareholders , e s p e c i a l l y 
minority shareholders , under s t a t e and common law equity and law. 
Raised below are some of the part i cu lar points of error i n 
t h i s proxy s tatement: 
Ott page s i x , EFFECT ON COMPANY'S FINANCIAL POSITION, your 
statement that the proposed d i s p o s i t i o n "will not have a materia l 
e f f e c t on the company's income and a s s e t s " i s , upon information and 
b e l i e f , f a l s e and mis leading , 
1. I t ignores the dual p o s i t i o n the company holds as both 
an equity holder in the sk i s lope corporation and i t s f a l l - b a c k 
p o s i t i o n when the notes are not paid t o rece ive a l l the property and 
improvements back. 
2 . To s t a t e that book value i s aero i s t o ignore how your 
accountants , Pr ice Waterhouse, o r i g i n a l l y determined the value of the 
company's i n t e r e s t s in the 10,000 acres and ski p r o p e r t i e s . According 
to your annual report for 1970, Price Waterhouse s ta ted that they were 
simply a s s ign ing the arb i trary value of the f i v e m i l l i o n d o l l a r s t o be 
(Continued) 
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reoeived from the UA Group aa the value, and vera unable to determine 
any cither values* As illustrated below, book value of land bald over 
10O ye«ra bears no relation to the true value. 
3. The above paragraph ignores that the original 197H agreement 
contemplated that the company could reoeive the property back in case 
of a default; that the protective provisions were not the usual ones 
of a mortgage ^nd bond solely? but vera eruch wore extensive, and 
actually of an owner who wee protecting himself in case the alleged 
lander and developer could not deliver on. bis express and implied 
promises to successfully develop tha ski area, which in fact baa now 
happened* 
4; You have available a number of appraisals of valuation of 
the aki xesort areas 
*u Valuation report submitted for SBA loan in the I9601*; 
b. $150,000.00 study dona by UA Group in 1970-71 as 
precondition to cloeing the ayxeemeut; 
c« Valuations and appraisal provided to various landing 
banks by the UA Croup ms part of landing done 1971 • 1975; 
d* Apprpjsals snd valuation reports tendered to Mergeu 
Cfc a ran tee group for 1974 loans; 
<j. e>. Appraisal and valuation as part of UPK landing $7<V)f/wi.rv 
to UA- GroupHEor ski resort in 1974; 
f* Financial statements 1971 - 1975 from UA Group, GPCC amd 
tha re«e, shoving prices received for house si tee
 f profits from sales , 
ate. 
Therefore i t would easily be possible for you to provide the 
(Continued) 
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shareholders with the e e t i m a t e * of value of the aki r e s o r t and 
component porta ao the ahareboldere could have some b a e i e t o decide 
the f e i m e a e of the c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o be rece ived aa recruired by Rule 
14 of the SBCf d i s p o s i t i o n of property. 
Tba l o g i o o f fered by your book value approach-to the UFK 
i n t e r e s t la i l l u s t r a t e d below.-
I p a r t i c u l a r l y %«nt t o o a l l your a t t e n t i o n t o t h e oueation 
of the fairnaaa of t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o be rece ived f o r ^the abandonment 
of both the equi ty p o s i t i o n In Bark City sk i area and t h e abandonment 
of the r i g h t under the o r i g i n a l agreeaent v l t h Union American and 
r e l a t e d a f f i l i a t e s t o recover a l l the property i f t h e payment* ware 
TJOX f a i t h f u l l y made, which I s t h e present f a c t . 
You make the s t a t e m e n t , t o summarisef tha t a l l the property 
I n t e r e s t of UPK in the thousands of acres of Park C i t y s k i area baa 
only nominal or no s p e c i a l book value (apparently lumping the s t o c k 
and underlying property r e v e r a i o n right together) and w i l l not 
a f f e c t the company's f i n a n c i a l p o a i t i o n . 
Following t h i s r e a s o n i n g , what i s the value t o t h e United 
S t a t e s of Alaska, which was aoouired within the same decade that the 
o r i g i n a l * predecessor of Uni ted Park Uines aoouired the s l o p e s of 
Park City . The United S t a t e s pa id $7 f000,000*00 (Seward *s P o l l y ) 
f o r Alaska, e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e book va lue . If your t e c h n i c a l reasoning 
l a c o r r e c t 9 the United S t a t e s could s e l l Alaska t o t h e o i l companies f o r 
(Continued) 
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t h a t seme e a o u n t and t h e c i t i z e n s would have r e c e i v e d book v a l u e
 p 
end t h e r e f o r e n o t a f f e c t e d t h e i r f i n a n c i a l c o n d i t i o n * 
A l a s k a i a an e x c e l l e n t example t h a t the book v a l u e o f p r o p e r t y 
a c q u i r e d 100 y e e r a a g o may b e a r n o r e l a t i o n s h i p t o i t e p r e s e n t t r u e 
v a l u e . Your a l l e g a t i o n t h a t t h a r a i a n o f i n a n c i a l l o s s t o t h e company 
baaed o o t h e book v a l u e of t h e l a n d , e i t h e r i n t h e e o u i t y v a l u e o f 
s t o c k o r t h e r e v e r s i o n a r y p r o p e r t y r i g h t i a , upon i n f o r m a t i o n *nd 
b e l i e f
 9 a M a t e r i a l m i s s t a t e m e n t t o t h e s t o c k h o l d e r s * d e p r i v i n g 
t h e n o f a n y r e a s o n a b l e b a s i s o f d e t e r m i n i n g the f a i r n e s s o f t h e 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n . 
REIJVTTOM CP UNION AKS3ICA TO UPK 
Your p r o x y a t a t e n a n t p r o v i d e s n o meaningfu l *ay f o r t h a 
s h a r e h o l d e r s t o e v a l u a t e v h e t h e r U n i o n America i s n o t r a c a i v i n g p i e c e s 
o f t h a s k i r * a o r t : t b a t p r o p e r l y b e l o n g t o UFK, 
1 . Tfie o r i g i n a l agraamant p r o v i d e d f o r t h e UA Croup t o p r o v i d e 
4 , 5 m i l l i o n I n c a p i t a l . Tha s e c o n d emendment t o t h e o p t i o n a g r e e m e n t 
a p p e a r s t o p r o v i d e t h a t Union Amer ica c o u l d lend 4 m i l l i o n t o t h a UA 
Group o f c o m p a n i e s i n v o l v e d i n t h e s k i r e s o r t . If t h i s i s t r u e , e r e 
any o f - t h e p r o p e r t i e s b e i n g d i s p o s e d o f i n - t h e Juna 2 2 a g r e e m e n t r e f e r r a 
t o on p a g e 5 o f y o u r proxy s t a t e m e n t i n payment o f t h a t u n s e c u r e d l e n d i n 
which w a s , w i d e r t h e s t o c k h o l d e r r a t i f i e d v e r s i o n , t o b e c a p i t a l a t 
r i s k b y U n i o n A m e r i c a . 
2 . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e March 1 9 7 4 i s s u e of F o r t u n e M e g a x i n a , 
page 2B8# a 1 3 0 0 1 4 0 
"An i n i t i a l $ 4 - m i l l i o n i n v e s t m e n t , a l r e a d y r e c o v e r e d , 
i n t h a 5 ,2rV>_acre e k i v i l l a g e o f P a r k C i t y , U t a h , f o r i n s t a n c e , 
baa p r o d u c e d $ 1 4 m i l l i o n i n d e v e l o p m e n t v c o n s t r u c t i o n , and1" 
l o n g - t e r m f i n a n c i n g f o r U n i o c i a m c r i c a , (Bob Volk , a n a r d e n t s k i e r , Q C ^ 3 9 5 
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f r e q u e n t l y e t a y a i n a c o n p o n y - o v n e d Pork Ci ty condominium. ) •• 
V h u r e - d i d t h e f o u r m i l l i o n coma f r o m ; di6 jnot par t of t h a t b e l o n g t o 
UPK; vow t h a t money euppoeed t o r e m a i n i n t h e company; have p r o f i t s 
e r r o n e o u s l y , u n f a i r l y and i l l e g a l l y b e e n drawn from t h e UA Group 
f o r t h e b e n e f i t o f Union America and r e l a t e d companiea i n d e t r i m e n t of 
UPK r i g h t a ? 
D o e s RSCf aa p a r t o f t h e Un ion America Group have a n y r i g h t a 
• u p e r i o r t o UPK t h a t e n t i t l e i t t o r e c e i v e o n e * h a l f o f t h e v a t e r 
r i g h t a ? What i a t h e b e n e f i t t o UPK i n e a s i g n i n g t h e a p p r o x i m a t e l y 
6 , 0 0 0 a c r e a i n t h e ak i a l o p e r a t h e r t h a n c a n c e l l i n a t h e l e e a e ? 
3 . Did n o t t h e d i r e c t o r e o f t h e UA Group, i n c l u d i n g GPCC, 
T r e a a u r e Mounta in and V e a t e r n M o r t g a g e , h a v e a f i d u c i a r y d u t y t o t h e 
a h a r e h o l d e r a o f UPK v h i c h we a I n c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e l o y a l t y t o t h e 
UA Group? What d e c i e l o n a a r e r e f l e c t e d i n t h e proposed e e e i g n i n g o f 
a a a a t e t o t h e UA Group? 
4„ Co a n y c o n f l i c t a e x i a t b e t w e e n t h e UA l e n d i n g g r o u p a n d 
t h e c o n t r o l l i n g a h a r e h o l d e r a o f UPK? 
UNAHS^/SRED PROXY STATEMENT QUESTIONS 
1 . What i a t h e e s t i m a t e d c o a t t o UPK o f t h e l i t i g a t i o n v h i c h 
m i g h t r e s u l t i f t h i e agreement i a n o t approved? 
2 # What i a t h e e a t i m a t e d v a l u e t o be r e c e i v e d by UPK i f t h e 
company 9 * r i g h t a a r e e n f o r c e d u n d e r t h e 1 9 7 0 egreetaent? 
PIKER PROBLEMS REGARDING PROXY STATTlgMT i " ^ - , 
T h e p r o x y s t a t e m e n t d o e s mtmta i n t w o p l a c e * o f t h e s i x - p a g e 
( C o n t i n u e d ) 0:^96 
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document tbatrUFK could recover a l l the property. Even a careful 
leading of the entire proxy statement would not alert the share-
holder to the following key facts t 
1. The original agreement ratified by the shareholders 
contemplated, in case of default, recovery of all the property, / 
end i t s language and intent was greater than a mortgage position. 
2. Any estimate of tha value of the various property 
rights being in effect abandoned i s omitted. If 6,<W* acres were 
only leased, why should UFK part with them now as pert of this 
arrangement? If the legal remedies are pursued and.all the property 
returned, what are the potential gains? 
3. What i s the security of the various lenders that they should 
receive moat of the equity, particularly in regard to tha UA Group?, 
4« It i s ignored that Park City has become one of the great 
ski resorts of the world, and i t s value and potential i s much greater 
than whan the agreement was f i r s t entered into in 1970. 
Unless the United States i s in a permanent recession or 
depression, the value of ski property i s likely to recover rapidly, 
I f THEREFORE, RESPECTFULLY DD4AKD that you in your individual 
capacities, and collectively as officers and directors of UFK adjourn 
the scheduled meeting of October 7 t 1975, revise the proxy statement 
in conformity with the SEC rules and reguletions, fully inform the 
(Continued) 
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T E L E G R A M 
October 6, 1975 
Jerome Gartner, Esq. 
310 Madison Avenue 
New York, N. Y. 10017 
We have your letters addressed to our Directors regarding the proposed re-
structuring of the balance sheet of Greater Park City Company. 
We have considered very carefully the matters set forth in your letters and ap-
preciate your interest in the problems involved. The proposed arrangement was 
arrived at after careful consideration of other alternatives and after exhaustive 
studies• 
The proposal is the result of such studies and research and is believed by 
management to be in the best interests of the Company and all its shareholders. 
We concluded that the best interests of the Company would be served by entering 
into the proposals. In this connection, it should be recognized that none of the 
rights and remedies" of the Company under the original contracts are being sur-
rendered except as set out in the proxy material. 
We are now faced with a situation in which Immediate action is imperative. The 
season is so far advanced that further -delay would jeopardize the opportunity 
of placing the proposal into effect. 
No useful purpose would be served by considering in detail all the material of 
your letters, some of which is not factual. However, we do believe that the 
proxy material accurately describes the essential provisions of the proposed 
arrangements« 
We are, therefore, under the necessity of proceeding with the meeting as scheduled» 
UNITED PARK CITY MINES COMPANY 
By Miles P. Romney, President 
04000 
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A. OBJECTIONS TO UNITED PARK'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
ARCO and ASARCO object to the following factual assertions 
contained in United Parkfs Statement of Facts. 
1. United Park asserts on page 10 of its Brief that ARCO 
and ASARCO generally voted their stock as one block and were able 
to effectively control United Park until the summer of 1985 when 
they sold their shares to Loeb. There is no support in the 
record for the assertion that ARCO and ASARCO voted their stock 
as one block or jointly controlled United Park. 
2. There is no support whatsoever in the record for the 
statement contained on page 10 of United Park's Brief that "All 
significant actions by United Park's board were either at the 
direction or with the consent of Anaconda and ASARCO." 
3. On page 10, footnote 2 of its Brief, United Park states 
that "Between 1982 and 1985, Cimarron pursued a merger with 
United Park, which required the support and approval of Anaconda 
and ASARCO." The only citation to the record is to an 
inadmissible conclusory statement contained in the Affidavit of 
David W. Bernolfo concerning the necessity of ARCO's and ASARCO's 
support. Of course, what was needed was support of the majority 
of the stockholders. In fact, ASARCO voted for the merger and 
ARCO voted against it. 
4. On page 10, footnote 2, United Park states that 
"Cimarron representatives could take no action in conflict with 
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the interests of Anaconda or ASARCO." United Park does not even 
attempt to cite any supporting reference to the record for this 
contention. 
5. On page 15 of its Brief, United Park states that Clark 
Wilson "conceded that, with respect to United Park's surface 
assets, the interests of Anaconda and ASARCO differed from the 
interests of United Park's other shareholders." In fact, all 
Wilson said when asked in his deposition whether during the 
negotiations of the 1975 transactions, "the interests of United 
Park City were different than the interests of Anaconda" was that 
"Well, at this point, it could have been. But I certainly 
couldn't name them." [R. 7930 at 112] 
6. On page 16 of its Brief, United Park asserts that ARCO 
and ASARCO "refused to allow United Park to preserve its equity 
in GPCC or its interest in the resort's property and other 
assets." There is absolutely no support in the record for this 
statement. 
7. United Park states on page 16 of its Brief that ARCO and 
ASARCO "had no interest in preserving United Park's interests in 
the ski resort but were concerned solely with protecting their 
mining interests." United Park relies solely upon the deposition 
of Gilbert Butler, Morgan-Fidelity's representative, to support 
this statement. Mr. Butler cannot, of course, properly testify 
as to what was going on in the mind of ARCO and ASARCO. 
Furthermore, what Mr. Butler actually said in his deposition was 
that the ski resort had failed twice, once when owned by United 
2 
Park and once when owned by GPCC, and that United Park simply 
wanted to protect the principal amount owing to it under the 1971 
agreements and protect the mining rights and had no interest in 
the future of the ski area. [R. 7954 at 109-110] 
8. On page 17 of its Brief, United Park argues that Royal 
Street, Morgan-Fidelity and Union America knew that ARCO and 
ASARCO "would agree to restructure GPCC on terms grossly unfair 
to United Park to protect Park City Ventures." This claim is 
absolutely unsupported by any citation to the record. 
9. On page 21 of its Brief, United Park asserts that the 
Park City Ski Resort had a value in 1974 of $15,600,000.00 using 
a discounted cash flow analysis method at a 12% discount rate. 
United Park relies solely upon an unsupported conclusory 
statement contained in Bernolfo!s Affidavit for this contention. 
There is, in fact, no support in the record for the contention 
that the ski resort had any such value in 1974. As a matter of 
fact, GPCC was on the verge of financial collapse. [See Amended 
Complaint, R. 2760-2847 at 2781-82] 
10. United Park recites on page 22, footnote 5 of its 
Brief, that "There is evidence that some of United Park's 
directors, like S.N. Cornwall, may have agreed" to the 1975 
transactions "based on the representations of GPCC that the land 
had no value." The sole "support" for this statement is the 
Affidavit of Lewis Callister, a former attorney for United Park, 
claiming that he had a conversation with Cornwall wherein 
Cornwall supposedly told him this. 
3 
11. On page 24 of its Brief, United Park claims that ARCO 
and ASARCO "caused United Park to make the undisclosed sale of 
valuable property in Deer Valley to Royal Street at prices well 
below market value.11 The only "support" for this contention is 
the unsupported and inadmissible statements contained in 
Bernolfo's Affidavit. 
B. OBJECTION TO FACTUAL STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN 
THE UNITED PARK ARGUMENT 
ARCO and ASARCO object to the following factual assertions 
contained in United Park's argument. 
1. United Park asserts on page 36 of its Brief that the 
proxy statement did not disclose to the stockholders that the 
resort had earned $1,000,000.00 in profit in the 1973-74 and 
1975-75 ski seasons. There is no support in the record for this 
assertion. In fact, the portion of the record cited by United 
Park demonstrates that United Park had a $2,000,000.00 net loss 
for the fiscal year ended September 30, 1973 and a $1,000,000.00 
net loss for the seven months ended April 30, 1974. [R. 6390] 
2. On page 3 6 of its Brief, United Park claims that the 
statement contained in the proxy that in the opinion of United 
Park's management, GPCC would be unable to continue business 
operations if the resort agreements were not approved was false 
because Union America had already cancelled GPCC's major debt in 
exchange for property and United Park's management knew or should 
4 
have known there was no real risk of bankruptcy. There is no 
support in the record for this assertion. Of course, Union 
America's cancellation of the debt was part of the 1975 
restructuring. 
3. On page 37 of its Brief, United Park argues that it gave 
away "all material benefits" to the surface utilization of United 
Park's developable properties and water rights and United Park 
was left dependent upon its underground mining interests. Again, 
United Park simply cites to the inadmissible conclusions set 
forth in Bernolfo's Affidavit. In fact, United Park was left 
with thousands of acres of developable property and the debt 
owing from GPCC. [United Park 1985 Annual Report and 10K, R. 
5839] 
4. United Park asserts on page 45 of its Brief that Sid 
Cornwall and Miles Romney "were implicated in the wrongdoing" by 
ARCO and ASARCO in connection with the 1975 transactions. There 
is absolutely no support in the record for this scurrilous 
assertion, nor were any directors named as defendants in this 
case. All the cited portion of the record demonstrates is that 
Cornwall and Romney were present at a meeting of the Board of 
Directors of United Park on September 19, 1975 at which the Board 
unanimously adopted a resolution approving the form of proxy, 
notice of annual meeting and proxy statement for the special 
meeting of stockholders to be held October 7, 1975, which had 
been prepared by United Park's attorneys. [R. 5934-5936] 
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